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“AN EVER CLOSER UNION” IN
CORPORATE IDENTITY?:
A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE ON
REGIONAL DYNAMICS AND THE SOCIETAS
EUROPAEA
JODIE A. KIRSHNER†
I.

INTRODUCTION

Upper and lower legal levels interact in both the United
States and Europe in the field of corporate law. In the U.S., a
dynamic exists between the federal government and the states.
While the U.S. Congress has tacitly delegated corporate law to
state legislation, the Commerce Clause of the Constitution
continues to authorize the federal government to act.1 During its
periodic entrances into the field, the federal government has
preempted the laws of individual states.2 In Europe, a similar

Treaty Establishing the European Community, Preamble, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 15.
†
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Denis Galligan, Professor of Socio-Legal Studies and Director of the Centre for SocioLegal Studies, University of Oxford; the UK Fulbright Commission; the Max Planck
Institute for Foreign and International Private Law, Hamburg, Germany; Paul
Davies, Allen & Overy Professor of Corporate Law, University of Oxford; and
Katharina Pistor, Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A.
McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 619, 624 (2006) (“The pattern of restraint does not follow from a constitutional
mandate . . . .”); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of
Corporate Law, REGULATION, Spring 2003, at 26 (“The question of who gets to
regulate public corporations thus is not one of constitutional law but rather of
prudence and federalism.”).
2
See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub.
L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm
(2006)); Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)–(e), 78n(d)–(f) (2006)); Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1978) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff (2006)). This has led to calls for
new models of federalism, in which the state and federal levels would explicitly
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dynamic operates between the European Union (“EU”) and its
Member States; the attempts by the EU to develop a legal
apparatus, split between regional3 and national levels, parallel
the division of federal and state responsibilities in the U.S. The
EU, however, has had to act in a more measured style:
Beginning with its earliest directives and continuing through its
recent, framework initiatives, Europe has reserved to its Member
States significantly more discretion to tailor regional goals to
local environments.4
The U.S. has refined its legal approach to corporate identity,
based on shared values and integrated legislative, judicial, and
political systems among the states over the last two hundred
years. Two legal precedents have supported the operations of
national business: Paul v. Virginia,5 a nineteenth century U.S.
Supreme Court case, established that states may not burden outof-state companies with additional regulations; and Dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence6 outlawed state legislation that
discriminated against companies from other states.7
Companies in Europe, however, have not, until recently,
been able to merge internationally or reincorporate in a different
country.8 The European Member States demonstrate a wide
variation in attitudes towards labor rights, shareholder

interact, especially in reaction to the “dualistic” view of federalism espoused by the
Rehnquist Court in its preemption caselaw. See also Robert Schapiro, Toward a
Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005).
3
“Regional,” for this purpose, refers simply to the European level and not to
specific “regions” of Europe, such as the “Benelux region.”
4
See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C
340), art. 249, para. 3 (noting that “[a] directive shall be binding, as to the result to
be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the
national authorities the choice of form and methods”).
5
75 U.S. 168 (1868).
6
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (empowering Congress “[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States”).
7
But see Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200–01 (1995)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (denouncing the Dormant Commerce Clause and seeking to
limit it to facially discriminatory local and state taxes).
8
See, e.g., CARLA TAVARES DA COSTA & ALEXANDRA DE MEESTER BILREIRO, THE
EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE 1 (2003); see also Eddy Wymeersch, The Transfer of
the Company’s Seat in European Company Law, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 661, 690
(2003).
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protections, corporate taxation, and other legal areas, making the
task of integration confronting Europe far greater than in the
U.S.9
Significant changes are taking place in Europe, however.
The European Union has recently implemented a transnational,
pan-European form for corporate law, the Societas Europaea
(“SE”).10 With the SE, the EU has attempted to craft a corporate
identity out of separate systems, in order to enable European
companies to operate more seamlessly across the region.11 While
the initial purpose of the SE was to provide a complete set of
European corporate law rules, political differences made doing so
impossible.12
A framework structure, containing numerous
references to national law, replaced the concept of a single set of
harmonized rules.13 Effectively, thirty distinct types of SEs have
9
See, e.g., Klaus Heine & Wolfgang Kerber, European Corporate Laws,
Regulatory Competition and Path Dependence, 13 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 47, 61 (2002).
A comparison between the corporate laws in the US and in the EU shows
that the diversity between European corporate laws is much larger than
between the corporate laws of the federal states in the US. Whereas it was
shown that in Europe the national corporate laws belong to several
different legal paradigms, the corporate laws in the US have, despite
important differences, so many central features in common that it is
reasonable to characterise the US corporate laws as being based upon the
same legal paradigm.
Id. For additional authority, see also W. Loeber Landau, The Federal and State
Roles in Regulating United States Business Corporations, in HARMONIZATION OF
COMPANY AND SECURITIES LAW: THE EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN APPROACH 31, 32
(Boudewijn Wachter ed., 1989).
By and large, the cultural and institutional differences among our several
States as they joined the Federal union were, though distinct, nowhere
near as great as those of the nations making up the European Community.
A common language was shared. The institutions of commerce were
evolving and were in no sense as mature and developed as the business
organizations of the present European Community members.
Id.
10
See generally Council Regulation 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 [hereinafter
SE Regulation]; see also Council Directive 2001/86/EC, (18), 2001 O.J. (L 294) 22, 23
[hereinafter SE Directive].
11
SE Regulation, supra note 10, pmbl. 1–7.
12
See, e.g., Vanessa Edwards, The European Company—Essential Tool or
Eviscerated Dream?, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 443, 443–50 (2003) (“Given the
apparently intractable political differences concerning worker involvement which
had dogged the proposed legislation, it is perhaps remarkable that agreement
ultimately proved possible.”).
13
See SE Regulation, supra note 10, pmbl. 4, 12, 20, 21, 26, arts. 4(3), 13, 15(1),
47(1), 51, 52(1)(b)–(2), 53, 54(1)–(2), 57, 59(1), 61, 62(1)–(2); see also Frits Bolkestein,
Member of the European Comm’n in Charge of the Internal Mkt. and Taxation,
Address at the University of Leiden: The New European Company: Opportunity in
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resulted,14 with a supplementary negotiation process for
establishing employee representation on company boards. The
result has raised concerns that rather than integrating European
commercial markets,15 the SE will instead introduce regulatory
competition16 and dilute national social protections.17
The current efforts of the EU to reconcile multiple national
regimes into a regional construct have significance for the U.S.
Not only do they affect global business and therefore concern
American companies, but an understanding of how regional
dynamics are evolving in Europe provides a better sense of how
legal regimes might evolve in the U.S. Although the two systems
are unlikely to mimic each other exactly and the final form of
initiatives in Europe remains far from clear, the spirit of how the
dynamics in Europe are developing has relevance to the U.S.,
particularly as the U.S. begins to devise new systems for
regulating activities that cross international boundaries.

Diversity (Nov. 29, 2002) (The “initial idea and the tangible achievement we have
today, namely ‘the new European Company,’ are worlds apart.”).
14
There are SEs for each of the twenty-seven EU Member States and for each of
the three additional Member States of the European Economic Area: Iceland,
Lichtenstein, and Norway. TAVARES & BILREIRO, supra note 8, at 18.
15
See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416, 416 (1956) (describing the theory of regulatory competition). According to
Catherine Barnard and Simon Deakin,
[T]he mechanism through which competition operates is mobility of persons
and resources across jurisdictional boundaries. In [Tiebout’s] ‘pure theory’
of fiscal federalism, local authorities compete to attract residents by
offering packages of services in return for levying taxes at differential
rates. Consumers with homogenous wants then ‘cluster’ in particular
localities. The effect is to match local preferences to particular levels of
service provision, thereby maximising the satisfaction of wants while
maintaining diversity and promoting information flows between
jurisdictions.
Catherine Barnard & Simon Deakin, Market Access and Regulatory Competition, in
THE LAW OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET: UNPACKING THE PREMISES 199
(Catherine Barnard & Joanne Scott eds., 2002); see also REGULATORY COMPETITION
AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES xxiii (Daniel C. Etsy &
Damien Geradin eds., 2001).
16
The first paper dealing with this idea was Luca Enriques, Silence Is Golden:
The European Company Statute as a Catalyst for Company Law Arbitrage, 4 J.
CORP. L.S. 77, 77 (2004).
17
Another line of scholarship has suggested that companies choose the SE over
other national corporate forms, in order to mitigate the requirements of mandatory
codetermination. See generally Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert & Lars Hornuf,
Die Societas Europaea: Empirische Bestandsaufnahme und Entwicklungslinien einer
neuen Rechtsform, 53 AG 721 (2008).
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A comprehensive, empirical analysis of the reasons that
companies incorporate as SEs has not been conducted until now.
While so far the number of companies that have changed their
status from national to pan-European has been relatively
modest,18 the group includes leading corporations in sensitive
sectors, such as financial services and insurance.
This comparative study of the SE is intended to decipher the
mechanisms and processes by which the legislation has triggered
the development of a more integrated European market, on the
one hand, and guarded against an increase in regulatory
arbitrage (both inter- and intra-state), on the other. It is based
on extensive in-person interviews with corporate decisionmakers,
union leaders, legal advisors, and policymakers in several
Member States and at EU headquarters.
The Article begins with an exploration of the approach the
SE takes to integration and its roots in EU politics. After
describing the methodology, it then presents a series of case
studies derived from the interviews, highlighting information
gathered in conversations with representatives from companies
that have converted to the SE as well as from those that have
not.
The data from the interviews suggest that although the EU
could not prescribe regional-level rules from the outset, the
preferences of companies considering the new form are now
stimulating increased convergence of corporate law in Europe.19
Companies that convert to the SE in order to streamline their
multinational operations and reduce their compliance obligations
promote the harmonization of additional areas of law and the
development of more regionalized regulation. Several features of
the SE legislation restrict companies from using the form for
inter-state arbitrage.20 Consequently, it has introduced only
18
See Established SEs Fact Sheet Overview, ETUI, http://ecdb.workerparticipation.eu/show_overview.php?letter=A&orderField=se_name&status_id=3&ti
tle=Established%20SEs (describing a continually updated list of established SE
companies) (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
19
See, e.g., Simon Deakin, Reflexive Governance and European Company Law,
17 EUR. L. J. 224 (2009); Simon Deakin, Legal Diversity and Regulatory Competition:
Which Model for Europe? (Ctr. for Bus. Research, Univ. of Cambridge, Working
Paper No. 323 (2006)) [hereinafter Legal Diversity].
20
In theoretical studies, Luca Enriques and others predicted that SE would
cause regulatory competition in Europe. Enriques, supra note 16, at 79; Marios
Bouloukos, The European Company (SE) as a Vehicle for Corporate Mobility Within
the EU: A Breakthrough in European Corporate Law, 18 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 535, 549–
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minimal regulatory competition to Europe. Member States that
undertake to attract reincorporating companies, however, have
offered them progressively similar terms, decreasing legal
diversity. While the SE has not appeared to threaten employee
representation on company boards, mandated in several Member
States including Germany,21 it has contributed to a reduction and
diversification in the number and nationality of the employee
representatives serving on them, bringing the Member States
into closer alignment on the issue and fueling more regionalized
labor organization. It will become increasingly important to
evaluate the need for safeguards for other constituencies, who do
not have power over corporate decisions.
The tensions between state and federal, national and
regional, play out with specificity in the corporate law arena,
instead of remaining a pure policy debate. Companies must
continue to operate, experiencing their own economic cycles as
the political context changes. If companies demonstrate that
increased federalization is beneficial for profit generation and for
other stakeholders, they offer support for the idea of the
European Union and the goal of regionalization more generally.
While regional consolidation reduces transaction costs for
companies, it may come at the expense of social welfare more
broadly.22
The development of innovative approaches for
50 (2007); Clark D. Stith, Note, Federalism and Company Law: A ‘Race to the
Bottom’ in the European Community, 79 GEO. L.J. 1581, 1611–12 (1991). Other
commentators who have analyzed the possibilities, however, have hypothesized that
the SE is not a sufficiently attractive tool. Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P. M.
Vermeulen, Does the European Company Prevent the ‘Delaware Effect’?, 11 EUR. L.J.
785, 792 (2005); W. Bratton, J. McCahery & E. Vermeulen, How Does Corporate
Mobility Affect Lawmaking? A Comparative Analysis (European Corporate
Governance Institute, Law Working Paper No. 91, 2008), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1086667.
21
Horst Eidenmüller and others have noted that the SE creates opportunities
for arbitrage within individual Member States, as regards their board structures, in
addition to the potential for arbitrage among Member States. Eidenmüller, Engert,
and Hornuf posed fourteen questions to SE companies in Germany during twentyminute telephone surveys and found strong evidence that firms use the SE to
mitigate the effects of mandatory codetermination. Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas
Engert & Lars Hornuf, Incorporating Under European Law: The Societas Europaea
as a Vehicle for Legal Arbitrage, 10 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2009); see also
Paul L. Davies, Workers on the Board of the European Company?, 32 INDUSTRIAL L.
J. 75, 75 (2003).
22
See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 635
(2004) (describing the federal government’s potential to be a “good influence—
because it’s the custodian of the American economy”—or a “pernicious influence—
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organizing areas split between regional and local spheres and
divided by borders appears to present a key challenge for modern
governance in all parts of the world. “Old America” and the “new
Europe”23 may have much on which they can work together.
II. METHODOLOGY
This Article is based on data I gathered in seventy-five
interviews, with general counsels, chief financial officers, and
other legal advisors at one half of the active SEs.24 The
companies I included have headquarters in Austria, Belgium,
China,
Cyprus,
Estonia,
France,
Finland,
Germany,
Luxembourg, Norway, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, and
comprise the biotechnology, chemical, electronic, financial
service, insurance, medical equipment, metal, oil, paper, real
estate, and reinsurance industries.25
For context, I also interviewed legal academics,
representatives to the European Commission, company lawyers,
labor advocates, journalists, and policy analysts at European
think tanks and nongovernmental organizations. Directors and
officers of companies that considered SE conversions but decided
against them in Bermuda, the Czech Republic, Germany,
Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, the United
Kingdom, Sweden, and Switzerland offered additional
viewpoints.
The resulting case study evidence of how European
companies perceive the SE sheds light on their decisionmaking
and the mechanisms through which EU legislation can advance a
single commercial Europe or introduce cross-border or withincountry arbitrage. Alternative methods to conducting fieldwork
in multiple jurisdictions would not achieve this. Quantitative
because it’s susceptible to error and interest group influence” and, due to its overarching position, can impose inefficient corporate rules).
23
See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Francis
Bowen ed., Henry Reeve trans., 3d ed. 1863) (1835).
24
The figure is as of August, 2008, when the Article entered the editing process.
By that date, 112 total SEs had been established, with 36 actually conducting
operations. The remainder exist legally but do not conduct business or employ any
workers.
25
The interviews were not intended as a random sample but as a means for
collecting firsthand accounts with which to understand the dynamics driving
corporate decisionmaking. See ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND
METHODS 12 (4th ed. 2009); Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Building Theories from Case
Study Research, 14 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 532, 534 (1989).
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studies are hindered by the wide variation in: (1) the number of
SE companies in different Member States; (2) the number of
companies in each Member State eligible to transform to the SE;
and (3) the number of companies in each Member Sate that
operate transnationally and would benefit from conversion to the
SE. The existence of nonoperational SEs also complicates
meaningful quantitative analysis, and the SE’s recent
implementation precludes gathering time series evidence in
order to demonstrate causation. Furthermore, because all of the
Member States have transcribed the SE legislation, no control
variable exists. The in-depth interviews also reveal disparities
between companies’ intentions in converting and the legal
obstacles they have encountered in following through: While
companies may report an interest in moving or recalibrating
their boards, investigating the legal mechanisms required can
expose sufficient unexpected costs and obstacles to dissuade
them.
III. HISTORY AND CONTEXT
Before exploring how companies in Europe are using the SE,
it is first necessary to understand the history and context of the
development of the legislation. The institutional structure of the
EU, the general legal environment in which European companies
operate, and the compromises necessary to attain consensus on
the SE legislation demonstrate parallel trends towards more free
competition among the Member States. A liberalizing evolution
can be documented in each area.
A.

Institutional Background

While the U.S. and the EU both represent sovereign entities
that have delegated specific responsibilities to a central
authority,26 the EU differs greatly from the U.S. in the
circumstances surrounding its inception and the form into which

26

See Landau, supra note 9, at 31.
Superficially at least there are some obvious similarities. The United
States began with a number of separate, highly autonomous and proudly
parochial colonies and then States, which united together for the common
good with great misgivings and strong desires to preserve prerogatives,
distinctions and independence. Their union was one driven by mutual
economic, commercial and military needs.

Id.
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it has evolved.27 The EU developed for economic reasons. Its
most significant achievements have occurred in the field of
business law,28 and its supranational structure chiefly reflects
the completion of a series of incremental steps towards the
creation of a single commercial market.29
The EU was formed in the wake of the Second World War,
and at the early stages of the developing Cold War between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union.30 Its establishment was primarily
intended to advance the economic goal of rebuilding and
reintegrating the German economy while addressing fresh
memories of German initiatives in two major world conflicts.31 In
1951, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg signed a treaty creating the European Coal and
Steel Community, which placed the industries under a
supranational authority and created a common market for

27
See Steve J. Boom, The European Union After the Maastricht Decision: Will
Germany Be the “Virginia of Europe?,” 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 177, 208 (1995) (stating
that the U.S. Constitution opens with the line “We the people,” while the Treaty of
Maastricht “opens with ‘His Majesty the King of the Belgians; Her Majesty the
Queen of Denmark; The President of the Federal Republic of Germany . . . ,’ leaving
no room for doubt that the parties to the Treaty of Maastricht are the sovereign
states of Europe, not the ‘people of Europe’ ” (internal citation omitted)).
28
See, e.g., First Council Directive 68/151, 1968 (EC) (addressing information
disclosure, contracts, dissolution); Second Council Directive 77/91, 1976 (EC)
(addressing capitalization of public companies); Third Council Directive 78/855, 1978
(EC) (addressing mergers of public limited liability companies); Sixth Council
Directive 82/891, 1982 (EC) (addressing divisions of public limited liability
companies); Fourth Council Directive 78/660, 1978 (EC), Seventh Council Directive
83/349, 1983 (EC), and Eighth Council Directive 79/1072, 1979 (EC) (addressing
accounts and auditing); Eleventh Council Directive 89/666, 1989 (EC) (addressing
company branches and disclosure); Twelfth Council Directive 89/667, 1989 (EC)
(addressing private limited liability companies).
29
See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in
International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743, 744–45 (1999) (discussing
“[t]he impulse to reduce diversity among the legal systems governing commerce”).
30
See Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First
Sight, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 489, 515 (2001) (discussing the consequences of this
particular history).
31
See, e.g., VICTORIA CURZON, THE ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
LESSONS OF EFTA EXPERIENCE 28–29 (1974).
The end of World War II was a time of heroic plans for institutionalizing
inter-state relations so as to bring order into international affairs and thus
blot out the danger of another war. Nowhere were these feelings expressed
more strongly than in Western Europe, where a federation of European
states was considered by many to be the only sound basis upon which to
build a lasting peace.
Id.
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them.32 At roughly the same time, France proposed a European
Defense Community with a single European army, in order to
rearm Germany while also constraining its military development
within a European context.33 The proposal was rejected in 1954,
however, and future European developments continued along the
more narrow path of economic integration.34
Each European country therefore retains far greater power
to govern than the fifty U.S. states.35 The EU, for example, holds
no responsibility for the provision of social welfare, has no police,
and sets no education policy.36 Because it was founded at a date
late in the development of the individual Member States, each
has its own attitudes towards integration and correspondingly
unique legislative goals.37 In the corporate law area specifically,
32
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community art. 99, Apr. 18,
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.
33
CURZON, supra note 31, at 30.
France responded to the strategic problems posed by West Germany in a
strikingly original manner. On the one hand, she proposed the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a plan to put German heavy industry
under joint European control; on the other, she proposed a European army
into which the rearmed German troops could be integrated. In this fashion
the economic and military recovery of Germany would be placed under
European, not to say specifically French, control. In the end, the European
Defence Community, which implied a unified European command . . . was
rejected by the French National Assembly, while the ECSC was
implemented.
Id.
34
Id.
With the failure of the European Defence Community, and its corollary, the
European Political Community, Monnet and his supporters turned to
economic integration as a third-best vehicle upon which to carry Western
Europe along the road to political union. The six foreign ministers of the
ECSC members met at Messina in June 1955 and agreed to study a
Benelux proposal to create a European common market covering all
products.
Id.
35
See Stephen Weatherill, Pre-emption, Harmonisation and the Distribution of
Competence To Regulate the Internal Market, in THE LAW OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN
MARKET: UNPACKING THE PREMISES, supra note 15, at 41, 42 (noting that we “must
interrogate the dilemma of emerging transnational governance in Europe which
assumes the economic viability of constructing a single market against a political
background of multiple sources of legislative authority”).
36
See Andrew Moravcsik, Federalism in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality, in THE
FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 165, 165–68 (Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Robert Howse eds.,
2001).
37
See, e.g., Ulrich Haltern, Integration Through Law, in EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION THEORY 177, 189 (Thomas Diez & Antje Wiener eds., 2004) (“Citizens
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each country’s national system of legal rules and distinct cultural
norms has posed challenges to the development of the single
market.38
Most corporate EU legislation has been based on specific
provisions of the Treaty of Rome.39 Signed by France, Germany,
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in 1957, the
Treaty launched the creation of the European Economic
Community (“EEC”)40 and explicitly enunciated a commitment to
the free movement of goods, services, labor, and capital among
the Member States, and the development of common policies for
external trade, competition, and agriculture.41 It empowered the
Council of Ministers to adopt new Community legislation to “coordinat[e] to the necessary extent the safeguards which, for the
protection of the interests of members and others, are required
by Member States of companies or firms . . . with a view to
making
such
safeguards
equivalent
throughout
the
Community.”42 Article 235 authorized the Community to “take
the appropriate measures” if “action by the Community should

do not identify with the Union; rather, they feel alienated . . . . The reason may be
that the nation, through its myths, provides a social home, a shared history, and a
common destination.”); see also Hans Lindahl, European Integration: Popular
Sovereignty and a Politics of Boundaries, 6 EUR. L.J. 239, 243–44 (2000).
38
See, e.g., James A. Fanto, The Role of Corporate Law in French Corporate
Governance, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 31, 36 (1998); Jette Steen Knudsen, Is the Single
European Market an Illusion? Obstacles to Reform of EU Takeover Regulation, 11
EUR. L.J. 507, 524 (2005); Antoine Rebérioux, European Style of Corporate
Governance at the Crossroads: The Role of Worker Involvement, 40 J. COMMON MKT.
STUD. 111, 126–27 (2002); Peer Zumbansen, European Corporate Law and National
Divergences: The Case of Takeover Regulation, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.
867, 869 (2004); see also Luca Enriques, Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered:
What Role for the EC, in EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW IN ACCELERATED PROGRESS
(S.M. Bartman ed., 2006).
39
See, e.g., ADRIAAN DORRESTEIJN ET AL., EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW 40 (2d ed.
2009).
40
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Preamble, Rome,
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
41
See id. arts. 137, 145, 155, 164.
The Rome Treaty laid the foundations for economic integration. This was
the principal focus of the Treaty, and it was a conscious decision after the
failures of the more ambitious attempts at European integration of the
mid-1950s. The particular form of economic integration chosen was a
common market. It was therefore more ambitious than other, lesser modes
of integration.
Paul Craig, The Evolution of the Single Market, in THE LAW OF THE SINGLE
EUROPEAN MARKET: UNPACKING THE PREMISES, supra note 15, at 1–2.
42
Treaty of Rome, supra note 40, art. 54(3)(g).
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prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the
common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers.” 43
European businesses have consistently supported European
integration.44 Faced with the need to operate across multiple
national systems with different and sometimes conflicting rules,
they showed interest in a European-level company, independent
of the laws of the individual Member States, even before the
formation of the European Community. The first proposal to
create the SE was made as early as 1910.45 A preliminary draft
of the SE statute, in 1966, utilized article 235 of the Treaty of
Rome as its foundation.46
During the prolonged negotiation process over the SE, and in
spite of increasing political ill will towards European initiatives,47
companies’ belief in the utility of a European corporate form
persisted. In a 1985 white paper, Completing the Internal
Market, the European Commission urged the adoption of the SE,
terming it “essential” for enabling companies to coordinate their

43

Id. art. 235.
See, e.g., Stephan, supra note 29.
45
ERIC STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS: NATIONAL
REFORM AND TRANSNATIONAL COORDINATION 439 (1971).
46
See Pieter Sanders, Projet d’un Statut des Societes Anonymes Europeennes
(Etude Serie Concurrence No. 6, 1967) [hereinafter 1966 Preliminary Draft Statute].
47
The Maastricht Treaty was first rejected in a Danish referendum and then
approved by French voters by a margin of just one percent. See RICHARD CORBETT,
THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT: FROM CONCEPTION TO RATIFICATION 65–67 (1993). In
addition to launching the transition to the Euro and creating the European Central
Bank, see Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191), 31 I.L.M. 253
(1992) [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty], it included a provision on a principle called
subsidiarity, whereby the Union may not take action unless it can be more effective
than national actors, a policy that has its roots in Catholic social teaching. Id. art.
3b. See generally Denis J. Edwards, Fearing Federalism’s Failure: Subsidiarity in
the European Union, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 537 (1996); Christoph Henkel, The
Allocation of Powers in the European Union: A Close Look at the Principle of
Subsidiary, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 359 (2002); A.G Toth, The Principle of
Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1079 (1992). Older
Member States resented the cost of helping poorer, Eastern European countries to
join the enlarging Union. John D. Donahue & Mark A. Pollack, Centralization and
Its Discontents: The Rhythms of Federalism in the United States and the European
Union, in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 36, at 73, 112. Others who
had cut their budgets to qualify for the Euro resented participating in regional-level
projects. Id. Germany in particular, faced with paying for the reunification of the
former East Germany, became less eager to contribute financially to Europe. Id.
44
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operations on a cross-border basis.48 In 1988, a commission
memorandum decried the inability of companies in Europe to
merge across national borders, the existence of inconsistent
national tax laws that skewed corporate decisionmaking, and the
lack of mutual recognition of companies among the European
Member States.49
The memorandum deemed cross-border
business activity imperative for successful competition against
the U.S. and Japan.50
B.

Legal Environment

The vision for the European single market has changed over
time. The idea of a closed, legally uniform arrangement with no
competition among the Member States was eventually overtaken
by a line of decisions by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”)
that has allowed companies more freedom to choose the national
legal system under which they will operate. The new judicial
openness towards competition among the Member States has
since been reflected in European legislation, including the SE.
Throughout the 1960s, the EEC promulgated a series of
corporate law directives chiefly designed to prevent competition
among the Member States.51 France sought to prevent its
companies from reincoroporating in other countries with more
permissive legal regimes. Germany joined with it in promoting a
program of top-down harmonization of corporate law to prevent
such a “race to the bottom.”52 The first generation of European
directives therefore largely restated the laws that the Member
States already held in common, such as minimum capital
requirements and rules mandating corporate disclosures.53
48

Commission White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, at 4, 26–27,
COM (85) 310 final (June 14, 1985).
49
Internal Market and Cooperation, Statute for the European Company,
Commission Memorandum, at 5, COM (88) 320 final (June 8, 1988) [hereinafter
1988 Memorandum].
50
Id.
51
See McCahery & Vermeulen, supra note 20; David Charny, Competition
Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective
on the “Race to the Bottom” in the European Communities, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 423,
424 (1991).
52
See CHRISTIAN W.A. TIMMERMANS, FIRST WALTER VAN GERVEN LECTURE:
COMPANY LAW AS IUS COMMUNE? 5 (Wouter Devroe & Dimitri Droshout eds., 2002).
53
First Council Directive 1968 O.J. SPEC. ED. (I) (disclosure of corporate data);
Second Council Directive 77/91, art. 6, 1977 O.J. (L 26) 31, 1 (EC) (establishing
capital minimums).
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Almost no competition to attract corporate charters
developed in Europe.54 Most Member States have observed the
real seat principle, which states that the laws of the country
where a company bases its operations govern all of its activities.55
The principle has prevented companies from incorporating in
countries with more lenient legal regimes if their businesses are
focused elsewhere.56
A series of judgments of the European Court of Justice,
beginning in 1999 with Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og
Seskabsstyrelsen,57 transformed the context within which the
integration of European corporate law was occurring. The
Centros line of cases seemed to introduce the potential for U.S.style regulatory competition among the EU Member States,58
although the ECJ’s 2009 decision in Cartesio Oktató és
Szolgáltató BT59 may indicate that the development has now run
out.

54

See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of
Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 350 (2001) (stating that while U.S. law
converged on Delaware, the real seat principle kept Europe from regulatory
competition and hence from convergence of its company laws).
55
See, e.g., Wymeersch, supra note 8, at 668 (“The ‘siege reel’ criterion was
introduced in France after discussion about French companies emigrating to the
legally more clement climate in Belgium in the 19th century.”).
56
See, e.g., Inne G. F. Cath, Freedom of Establishment of Companies: A New
Step Towards Completion of the Internal Market, in YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW
247, 247 (Francis G. Jacobs ed., 1988); Robert R. Drury, The Regulation and
Recognition of Foreign Corporations: Responses to the ‘Delaware Syndrome’, 57
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 166, 187 (1998).
57
Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I01459.
58
See Gilson, supra note 54, at 351 (stating that Centros destabilized the
equilibrium of diverse corporate regimes). See generally Kilian Baelz & Teresa
Baldwin, The End of the Real Seat Theory (Sitztheorie): The European Court of
Justice Decision in Ueberseering of 5 November 2002 and Its Impact on German and
European Company Law, 3 GERMAN L.J. 12 (2002); Sebastian Mock, Harmonization,
Regulation and Legislative Competition in European Corporate Law, 3 GERMAN L.J.
12 (2002); Larry E. Ribstein, The Evolving Partnership, 26 J. CORP. L. 819, 821
(2001); Wulf-Henning Roth, From Centros to Ueberseering: Free Movement of
Companies, Private International Law, and Community Law, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
177 (2003).
59
Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt, 2008 E.C.R. I-9641 (denying
a Hungarian company the right to remain subject to Hungarian law after moving its
central headquarters to Italy).
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In Centros, two Danish citizens incorporated a company in
the UK in order to avoid Denmark’s rigorous minimum
capitalization requirements.60 They intended to establish a
branch of the company in Denmark, which would carry out its
principal business.61 The Danish commercial registry, in an
attempt to uphold the spirit of the national laws, refused to
register the branch.62 The ECJ reversed the decision on free
establishment grounds,63 and many legal commentators assumed
that the ECJ had indicated that the real seat principle violated
the right to free establishment64 set out in the Treaty of Rome.65
Überseering and Inspire Art, two later cases, seemed to
confirm a view of the ECJ that companies may incorporate in any
Member State they choose.66 In Überseering, the ECJ held that it
was incompatible with the freedom of establishment for a
Member State to deny judicial standing to a company that had
moved its administrative headquarters.67 Überseering had been
formed according to Dutch law, but its shareholders and
principal office were located in Germany.68 A German court ruled
that German corporate law, not Dutch, applied to the company
because of the location of its headquarters and that the Dutch
corporate entity had no standing in German court.69 The ECJ
overturned the decision of the German court, holding that a

60

Id.
Id.
62
Id.
63
See Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999
E.C.R. I-01459.
64
Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community arts. 43, 48, Rome, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J.
(C 321) 31, 34 [hereinafter TEU].
65
Note that in Cartesio, the ECJ firmly rejected such speculation, affirming the
validity of the real seat theory by denying a Hungarian company the right to remain
subject to Hungarian law after moving its central headquarters to Italy. Case C210/06, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt, 2008 E.C.R. I-9641, ¶¶ 119, 124. Under
Cartesio, if a company moves its real seat, the Member State where it was originally
incorporated may choose not to continue to recognize it as a company of its own
nationality. Id.
66
See, e.g., Thomas Bachner, Freedom of Establishment for Companies: A Great
Leap Forward, 62 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 47, 48–49 (2003); Baelz & Baldwin, supra note
58; Frank Wooldridge, Überseering: Freedom of Establishment of Companies
Affirmed, 14 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 227, 227 (2003) (discussing Überseering).
67
C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH
(NCC), 2002 E.C.R. I-9919, ¶ 94.
68
Id.
69
Id.
61
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foreign-incorporated company must be recognized, regardless of
the location of its administrative seat.70 In Inspire Art, the ECJ
disallowed rules mandating the application of the laws of the
host state to companies registered in other Member States.71 A
Dutch company incorporated in the UK had registered a branch
office in the Netherlands, and the Netherlands had applied
Dutch corporate law in accordance with its rules for foreign
companies.72
The SE legislation reflects the transformation in the
equilibrium that had existed in Europe, in which companies did
not move between Member States and generally incorporated
where they conducted their primary operations. The legislation
has explicitly allowed companies to reincorporate, subject to the
requirement that they also move their headquarters,73 and its
references to national law have introduced a novel potential for
Member States to begin competing for corporate charters.74
Subsequent EU legislation has followed the approach of the
SE in creating a European framework with references to national
law, rather than directly harmonizing the substantive law of the
Member States. The Takeover Directive,75 for example, allows
Member States discretion over the legality of defensive measures
against hostile bids.76
The European Commission adopted
“recommendations” rather than binding directives on directors’
remuneration and the role of nonexecutive and supervisory
directors.77 In September 2001, the Commission established a
High Level Group of Company Law Experts (“High Level Group”)
to reform the regulatory framework in which EU corporate law
70

Id.
Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v.
Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-10155.
72
See id.
73
SE Regulation, supra note 10, art. 7.
74
See id. arts. 4(3), 13, 15(1), 41(1) para. 1, 51, 52(1)(b), 52(2), 53, 54(1)–(2), 57,
59(1), 61, 62(1)–(2).
75
See Council Directive 2004/25/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12–13.
76
Id. at 12 (concerning takeover bids).
77
Press Release, European Comm’n, Corporate Governance: Commission Urges
Member States To Ensure a Strong Role for Independent Directors (Oct. 6, 2004),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/1182&
format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; Press Release, European
Comm’n, Directors’ Pay—Commission Sets out Guidance on Disclosure and
Shareholder Control (Oct. 6, 2004), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=IP/04/1183&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLangu
age=en.
71
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operates.
The High Level Group expressly disavowed the
substantive harmonization of corporate law through directives,
stating that their lack of flexibility “petrifies” corporate
structures.78
C.

Framework Form

As Europe turned from the complete harmonization of its
corporate law towards permitting more open competition among
the Member States, the SE itself evolved in a similar way.
Successive drafts of the SE legislation over the course of the
forty-year negotiation period79 reflect increasing deference to the
prerogatives of the Member States, especially in the areas of
taxation and social rights.
The European Commission’s first proposal for the SE,
drafted in 1970, included more than four hundred articles, which
detailed provisions for the corporation’s formation, capital
structure, and management structure; the rights of shareholders;
accounting; liquidation; and insolvency.80 The comprehensive
rules freed European companies from citizenship in any
particular country;81 the legislation stated expressly that
national development of business could “fragment markets,”
reducing the economic competitiveness of Europe.82
The final legislation, by contrast, contains only seventy
articles.83 The framework it provides refers to national law sixtyfive distinct times.84
A significant source of disagreement among the Member
States concerned whether the SE legislation should include a
European system of taxation, with losses in one Member State
78

REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF EXPERTS, A MODERN REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE 31 (2002).
79
See Council Regulation 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 (EC).
80
See Pieter Sanders, The European Company, 6 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 367,
367 (1976); see also Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for
European Companies, at 11, COM (75) 150 final (Mar. 10, 1975) [hereinafter 1975
Draft Statute].
81
See generally GROUP OF EXPERTS, EUROPEAN SYSTEMS OF WORKER
INVOLVEMENT (1997).
82
Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation Embodying a Statute for the
European Company, at 5, COM (70) 600 final (June 30, 1970) [hereinafter 1970
Draft Statute].
83
See Council Regulation 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1–18 (EC).
84
SE Regulation, supra note 10, arts. 4(3), 13, 15(1), 47(1), 51, 52(1)–(2), 53,
54(1)–(2), 57, 59(1), 61, 62(1)–(2).
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offset against gains in another or whether each country could
maintain its own, separate scheme.85 The Commission’s first
proposal for the SE, in 1970, provided for the uniform taxation of
SE companies.86 Its next proposal, in 1989,87 deemphasized
taxation88 but afforded companies new freedoms to offset losses
among Member States.89 The final SE legislation90 does not
include any provisions on taxation.91
The European Commission also struggled to craft guidelines
for employee representation92 on company boards sufficiently
liberal to satisfy the Member States that have not mandated it,
without antagonizing the Member States committed to its
continuation.93 Several Member States require specific levels of
employee representation for different types of companies of
different sizes, while others have no equivalent systems.94 The
Commission’s first proposed legislation mimicked the most
rigorous national requirements for representation: a mandatory
two-tier board with employees filling at least one-third of the
supervisory board seats.95 The Commission’s next proposal, in
1989,96 divided the legislation into a regulation and a directive,
and relegated provisions for employee representation to the

85
Compare Proposal for a Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, at
67, COM (89) 268 final (Aug. 25, 1989), with Amended Proposal for a Council
Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, at 31, COM (91) 174 final (May
6, 1991) (stating that for the purpose of taxation, the SE must be made subject to the
laws of the State in which it resides).
86
See 1970 Draft Statute, supra note 82.
87
1989 O.J. (C 263) 41, COM (89) 268 final (Oct. 16, 1989); 1991 O.J. (C 138) 8,
COM (1991) 174 final (May 29, 1991) [hereinafter 1991 Proposed Regulation].
88
Compare 1988 Commission Memorandum, supra note 49, at 8–10, 21, with
1991 Proposed Regulation, supra note 87, art. 133, at 67–68.
89
See 1970 Draft Statute, supra note 82, arts. 278–81, at 220–23; 1975 Draft
Statute, supra note 80, arts. 278–81, at 119–21.
90
See Council Regulation 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 (EC).
91
SE Regulation, supra note 10, recital 20.
92
See, e.g., Claire Leca, The Participation of Employees’ Representatives in the
Governance Structure of the Societas Europeae, 18 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 403, 403–04
(2007).
93
Employee involvement has posed a similar obstacle to the adoption of the
Fifth Directive and the Cross-Border Merger Directive. See, e.g., Geoffrey Fitchew,
Political Choices, in EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON
INTEGRATION AND HARMONIZATION 1, 12 (Richard M. Buxbaum et al. eds., 1991).
94
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE 30 (European Comm’n ed., 2000).
95
1970 Draft Statute, supra note 82, arts. 62, 73, 137.
96
1989 O.J. (C 263) 41; COM (89) 268 final. The Commission amended this draft
in 1991. See 1991 O.J. (C 176) 1, COM (91) 174.
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directive.97
After it failed to draw sufficient support, the
Commission established the High Level Group, chaired by former
Commission President Etienne Davignon. The High Level Group
devised a solution to the deadlock on employee representation by
judging the Member States’ attitudes towards representation too
diverse for harmonization and outlining a negotiation process, in
place of a static set of compromise rules.98 The final directive
sets out a compulsory negotiation period between management
and employees, with a principle known as “before and after”
taking effect when negotiations fail.99 According to the principle,
management must guarantee that the same level of
representation, if any, will continue after conversion to the SE.100
The directive seemed to assure the Member States that
companies with representation would not be able to use the SE to
evade it and that companies without representation would not
have to offer it to their employees if they converted to the SE.101
In fact, however, because the legislation does not preempt
national law,102 companies have converted to the SE in order to
substitute its rules for national requirements for employee
representation.103

97
Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company,
1989 O.J. (C 263) 41; Proposal for a Council Directive Supplementing the Statute for
a European Company with Regard to the Involvement of Employees, BULL. EUR.
COMMUNITIES, May 1989, at 1 [hereinafter 1991 Proposed Directive]. The provisions
offered Member States three separate models of participation from which they could
choose: representation on corporate boards parallel to the German model of workers’
rights, representation on a separate works council according to the French system,
or a negotiated arrangement for representation as suggested by Swedish practices.
It also offered SE companies the ability to select between a one and two-tier board.
1991 Proposed Directive, supra, art. 61, at 31.
98
1991 O.J. (C 176) 1, COM (91) 174.
99
SE Directive, supra note 10, at 22, 23.
100
Id.
101
See generally Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation on Corporate Boards:
Impacts and Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic Intergration in
Europe, 14 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 203 (1994).
102
See, e.g., Jaap Winter, Thalassa! Thalassa!—The SE as a Glimpse of the
Future?, in THE EUROPEAN COMPANY 113, 122 (Jonathan Rickford ed., 2003);
TAVARES & BILREIRO, supra note 8, at 11.
103
See, e.g., Leca, supra note 92, at 417; Cristoph Teichmann, Restructuring
Companies in Europe: A German Perspective, 15 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1325, 1334
(2004).
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A compromise on the SE was finally reached in December
2000.104 Following negotiations with the European Parliament,
the SE came into force on October 8, 2004.105 As of January 2008,
129 SE corporations have been established, although many of
them do not yet conduct operations or employ any workers.106
IV. HOW ARE COMPANIES USING THE SE?
Legal commentators, beginning with Luca Enriques,
predicted that the SE legislation’s references to national law107
would combine with the SE’s ability to move108 to create
possibilities for Member States to compete for incorporations.109
They forecast a new European corporate charter market.110
Horst Eidenmüller and others noted that the SE Directive also
offers opportunities for arbitrage within Member States over
employee representation. Companies may choose between the
rules of the new form and national requirements for board
structures.111
My interview data, however, suggest that the SE primarily
facilitates within-group restructuring by allowing for legal crossborder mergers. Companies have used SE conversions to absorb
their subsidiaries and establish branches, without the legal
contortions that had previously been necessary.
Branched
structures have enabled companies to gain integrated
supervision in specific industries.

104

Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, para. 21 (Oct. 16, 2008).
Council Regulation 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 (EC), art. 70. The SE
Regulation applies directly to the Member States, but the SE Directive needed to be
transposed into national law. By October 8, 2004, only Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, Hungary, Iceland, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
had done so. See Directive 2001//86/EC–State of Implementation 1st September
2007, available at http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2946&langId=en.
106
See infra Part III.B.3.
107
Council Regulation No. 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1–18 (EC), arts. 4(3), 13,
15(1), 47(1), 51, 52(1)–(2), 53, 54(1)–(2), 57, 59(1), 61, 62(1)–(2).
108
Id. art. 8; see also TAVARES & BILREIRO, supra note 8, at 11.
109
Luca Enriques, Silence Is Golden: The European Company Statute as a
Catalyst for Company Law Arbitrage (Working Paper No. 07/2003, 2004). But see
McCahery & Vermeulen, supra note 20; Bratton, McCahery & Vermeulen, supra
note 20.
110
See, e.g., Bouloukos, supra note 20, at 549; Stith, supra note 20.
111
SEs may opt for a one-tier or two-tier board and negotiate employee
participation, Council Regulation 2157/2001, art. 7, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 4 (EC), with a
fall-back position defined by the “before and after principle.” Id. art. 38(b); see also
Davies, supra note 21, at 80–81; Eidenmüller, Engert & Hornuf, supra note 21, at 2.
105
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This Article analyzes case studies of how companies are
making use of the SE and argues that the patterns of use will
ultimately lead to a deeper regionalization of law and regulation
in Europe. Companies in industries in which a parent company
and its branches are not regulated together have demanded new
regional regulatory structures and the harmonization of
additional areas of law. While many companies report that the
cost of reincorporating and making changes to corporate boards
outweighs the benefits to be gained, those that have used the SE
to move have reduced distinctions in the laws of the Member
States. The few companies that have converted to the SE to
adjust the number and nationality of employee representatives
on their boards have established new boards more similar to
those in countries without employee representation. This Section
explores the mechanisms for legal convergence that use of the SE
provides, and it describes the aspects of the legislation that
constrain companies from employing the form for regulatory
competition and internal arbitrage.112
A.

Completing the Single Market?

Companies in specific industries have used the SE to correct
a misalignment that has developed between national regulatory
oversight and international business activities.
Most
multinational companies in Europe have continued to report to
multiple national supervisors, even as the strategies they pursue
and the risks they assume take place on an increasingly regional
or global level. Because the SE allows for legal cross-border
mergers, it facilitates regional restructuring by enabling
companies to replace their subsidiaries with branches. Leading
companies in the insurance and reinsurance industries have

112

See, e.g., Udo C. Braendle & Juergen Noll, The Societas Europaea—A Step
Towards Convergence of Corporate Governance Systems? (2005) (discussing trends
towards global convergence), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=704881; Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, in
CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 33, 50–55 (Jeffrey N.
Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of
Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997). But see Douglas M. Branson, The Very
Uncertain Prospect of “Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 321, 329 (2001).
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converted to the SE and adopted a branched structure, in order
to achieve integrated regulation at the level of the parent
company.113
As a result, the form appears to be progressing114: In the
four years since its introduction,115 the number of companies to
convert has risen sharply.116 Companies in sectors where unified
regulation is unachievable, however, have been less likely to
adopt the SE. The complete legal environment with which
companies interact constrains what they can use the form to
accomplish.

113

See, e.g., Weatherill, supra note 35, at 41.
[T]he dominant legislative preference is for a system of ‘home State
control’, according to which harmonised rules of proper regulatory conduct
are agreed at Community level but enforced at national level and pursuant
to which it is assumed that ‘home States’ will subject firms based on their
territory to the agreed Community rules while ‘host States’, in which target
consumers of the firm are based, are excluded from actively applying not
only domestic rules, but even in some circumstances the agreed Community
rules. The host State’s competence is pre-empted; the home State is
expected to perform the job of supervision.

Id.
114

According to one company lawyer, eighty-five percent of his time over the last
eight months has been spent on SE projects. Interview with Anonymous Source No.
28, location not identified (Feb. 21, 2008) (on file with author).
115
It should be noted that many countries did not meet the October 8, 2004
deadline for implementing legislation. See ERNST & YOUNG, STUDY ON THE
OPERATION AND THE IMPACTS OF THE STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY (SE),
FINAL REPORT (2009) 55, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
consultations/docs/2010/se/study_SE_9122009_en.pdf.
116
See infra Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Timeline117

The SE is therefore a nascent but revealing factor that
challenges the Member States to cede national authority over
corporate law and regulation. While originally they could not
agree on a complete system of corporate law, the diverse national
systems of the Member States will begin to converge as
companies interested in converting to the SE encounter its
limitations and demand more legal harmonization and regional
regulation.
Questions persist, however, over the normative benefits of
convergence, particularly for noncorporate stakeholders. The
desirability of bank branching has become central to the debate
over how to protect citizens from the consequences of financial
crises. Small countries, such as Iceland118 and Austria,119 may
have difficulty rescuing large, vertically integrated companies
that operate transnationally.120
In the banking sector
117
EUROPEAN TRADE UNION INSTITUTE, OVERVIEW OF CURRENT STATE OF SE
FOUNDING IN EUROPE 3 (2010).
118
Assets in Iceland’s banking sector were eight times its GDP, half of which
were non-local. Pelt Tightening: A Country Staggers Back to its Feet, ECONOMIST,
July 23, 2009, available at http://www.economist.com/node/14098340.
119
Austria had loaned more than forty-three percent of its GDP to European
customers. Who’s Next?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 2008, available at http://www.
economist.com/node/12465279?story_id=12465279.
120
See Jean Dermine & Dirk Schoenmaker, In Banking, Is Small Beautiful?, 19
FIN. MKTS., INSTITUTIONS & MKTS. 1, 9 (2010). See generally William H. Buiter &
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specifically, political obstacles inhibit the use of taxpayer money
to bail out depositors from other countries. Yet streamlining the
regulation of cross-border business activities through branching
could assist executives and directors of large companies in their
monitoring and compliance duties by reducing the number of
regulatory interfaces and also their complexity. Gathering
information in a single supervisor could also provide a truer,
more comprehensive picture of the activities of multinational
companies and contribute to more accurate predictions of
systemic problems.
1.

Within-Group Restructuring

Companies have adopted the SE to reduce their expenses.
Prior to the implementation of the Directive on Cross-Border
Mergers,121 the SE provided the only means for companies to
complete legal, international mergers.122 The SE legislation has
therefore liberated them from the costly legal contortions that
had previously been necessary.123 It has also enabled them to
absorb their subsidiaries and establish branches. Companies
that have used the SE to adopt a branched structure for
integrated supervision have reported savings of more than €350
million.124 The SE has enabled them to reduce share price
premiums, the cost of complying with reporting requirements,
and the amount of regulatory capital they must reserve. The SE
has also created a mechanism for companies to move between
Member States, which has allowed them to consolidate their
operations without losing other privileges. In describing its
motivation for creating the SE, the European Commission stated,

Anne Silbert, The Icelandic Banking Crisis and What To Do About It: The Lender of
Last Resort Theory of Optimal Currency Areas, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
RESEARCH, POLICY INSIGHT, Oct. 2008, available at http://www.cepr.org/
pubs/policyinsights/PolicyInsight26.pdf.
121
See Council Directive 2005/56/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 310) 1. Compare Council
Directive 2005/56/EC (which took 20 years to complete), with Commission Proposal
for a Tenth Directive of the Council Based on Article 54(3)(G) of the Treaty
Concerning Cross-Border Mergers of Public Limited Companies, 1985 O.J. (C 23) 1,
COM (1984) 727 final (Jan. 8, 1985) (one year between first draft and final draft).
122
See TAVARES & BILREIRO, supra note 8, at 21 (“With the sole exception of
Italian law, most national laws render cross-border mergers almost impracticable.”).
123
See, e.g., Bouloukos, supra note 20, at 539 n.11 (explaining the complicated
methods companies used instead).
124
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 28, location not identified (Feb. 21,
2008) (on file with author).
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“it is essential that companies the business of which is not
limited to satisfying purely local needs should be able to plan and
carry out the reorganisation of their business on a Community
scale.”125
a.

Cross-Border Mergers

Companies have converted to the SE in order to gain
ownership of their subsidiaries using mergers rather than
takeovers, at lower cost and risk.
Case 1: Allianz (Germany)
Allianz, the blue chip German insurance and asset
management company operating in twenty-nine European
countries, became an SE in order to merge with its 55.4%-owned
Italian subsidiary, Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà (“RAS”).126 RAS
owned substantial holdings in four subsidiaries of Allianz located
in Switzerland, Austria, Portugal, and Spain. Absorbing RAS
conferred nearly complete ownership of the subsidiaries,
simplifying Allianz’s structure.127

125

Council Regulation 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 (EC).
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 21, location not identified (Jan. 21,
2008) (on file with author).
127
See infra Figure 2.
126
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Figure 2. The Organizational Structure of Allianz128

Although conversion to the SE took more than one year, it
formed a necessary step in the absorption of RAS by Allianz.129
Without the capacity to complete a cross-border merger, Allianz
could only have acquired RAS through a takeover bid.130 While a
merger requires the approval of two-thirds of a target’s
shareholders, a takeover bid requires the cash acquisition of
nearly all of the target’s shares in order to trigger a squeeze-out

128
Allianz in Europe: Transition to the Societas Europaea 7 (Oct. 16, 2006),
available at https://www.allianz.com/static-resources/images-2006-12-13/pdf/saobj_
1271040_allianz_se_presentation_md_eng2.pdf.
129
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 3, location not identified (Dec. 3, 2007)
(on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 4, location not identified
(Dec. 10, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 5,
location not identified (Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 29, location not identified (Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with
author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 30, location not identified (Feb. 22,
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 31, location not
identified (Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 39, location not identified (Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 65, location not identified (Mar. 11, 2008) (on file with
author).
130
The Cross-Border Merger Directive had not yet taken effect. See Council
Directive 2005/56/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 310).
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process. National law proscribes the squeeze-out threshold; in
Italy the threshold is ninety-eight percent.131 Observers say that
hold-out shareholders would have prevented Allianz from buying
enough shares in RAS to complete a takeover.132
b.

Creation of Branched Structures

Other companies have used the SE to merge with their
international subsidiaries and replace them with branches.
While subsidiaries must report individually to their national
regulators,133 branches in some sectors may report jointly to the
national regulators of their parent companies.134
The
streamlined supervision that results reduces compliance costs
and eliminates conflicting obligations.135
Case 2: Scor (France)
Scor, the French reinsurance company, created three SEs in
order to take advantage of the 2005 EU Reinsurance
Directives,136 which offer combined supervision to reinsurance

131
See Christian E. Decher, Cross Border Mergers: Traditional Structures and
SE-Merger Structures, 4 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 5, 8–10 (2007); Marco Ventoruzzo,
Cross-border Mergers, Change of Applicable Corporate Laws and Protection of
Dissenting Shareholders: Withdrawal Rights Under Italian Law, 4 EUR. CO. & FIN.
L. REV. 47, 50–55 (2007); Eddy Wymeersch, Do We Need a Law on Groups of
Companies?, Ghent University Financial Law Institute (2000).
132
See Interview with Anonymous Source No. 3; Interview with Anonymous
Source No. 4; Interview with Anonymous Source No. 5; Interview with Anonymous
Source No. 29; Interview with Anonymous Source No. 30; Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 31; Interview with Anonymous Source No. 39; Interview
with Anonymous Source No. 65.
133
See, e.g., Second Council Directive, 89/646, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1 (EEC).
134
See, e.g., Jean Dermine, Presentation at the Conference on Cross-Border
Banking, Regulatory Challenges: European Banking Integration: Don’t Put the Cart
Before the Horse (Oct. 11, 2005); European Commission, Supervision of Branches,
MARKT/G/3/MV D 2 (2007). Even so, the host country remains responsible for
liquidity issues as well as monetary policies. See Council Directive 2000/12, art. 22,
2000 O.J. (L 126) 1, 3 (EC).
135
Ample reasons to retain subsidiaries persist, however. Subsidiaries boast
limited liability, a separate, “local” legal entity, and predictable tax treatment,
among other features. See Jean Dermine, European Banking Integration and the
Societas Europaea: From Host-Country to Home-Country Control, in CROSS-BORDER
BANKING: REGULATORY CHALLENGES 49, 51 (Gerard Caprio, Jr. et al. eds., 2006)
(“[I]rrespective of the existence of a single market, the international management
literature predicts that international firms will operate with a mix of branches and
subsidiaries . . . .”).
136
See Council Directive 2005/68, 2005 O.J. (L 323) (EC) [hereinafter
Reinsurance Directives]; Interview with Anonymous Source No. 20, location not
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companies and their branches.137 Reinsurance involves the
distribution of global risk, and the directives reflect the
desirability of monitoring the overall strategies of reinsurance
companies rather than their activities within individual Member
States.138 Scor converted Scor SA, the French holding company
at its head, into Scor SE. Over the next year and a half, it
established two subordinate SE companies, Scor Global Life SE
and Scor Global P&C SE; merged into them its German, Italian,
and Dutch subsidiaries; and established new branches in their
place.139
By replacing its subsidiaries with branches, Scor achieved
not only centralized regulation but also significant savings in
compliance and corporate governance costs.140 Branches, unlike
subsidiaries, do not have to file corporate reports, convene
separate boards,141 or pay VAT taxes on transactions with their
parent companies.142
In other sectors, however, the SE would not have provided
the same benefits. As one lawyer explained, “[e]ach regulated
industry is different; selling tractors would be different [because
the branches of a tractor company would continue to report to
multiple national regulators]. The SE was sold to the public as a
one-size fits all tool, and it’s not.”143

indentified (Feb. 12, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 45, location not identified (Feb. 15, 2008) (on file with author).
137
Reinsurance Directives, supra note 136, recital 9 (“This Directive . . . mak[es]
it possible to grant a single authorisation valid throughout the Community and
apply the principle of supervision by the home Member State.”); id. art. 15(1) (“The
financial supervision of a reinsurance undertaking, including that of the business it
carries on . . . through branches . . . shall be the sole responsibility of the home
Member State.”).
138
See id. recital 4.
139
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 20; Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 45.
140
As the CFO of one SE said in an interview, “The FSA tried to make us have
independent directors in our tiny UK subsidiary. I said go to hell and established a
branch.” Interview with Anonymous Source No. 20.
141
See, e.g., Adams v. Cape Indus., (1990) Ch. 433, 536 (A.C.) (U.K.); Case C168/01, Bosal Holding BV v. Staatssecretaris van Financien, 2003 E.C.R. I-9409 ¶
32; Case 6-7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA v. Comm’n of European
Cmtys., 1974 E.C.R. 223 ¶ 37.
142
See Case C-210/04, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze v. FCE Bank
PLC, 2006 E.C.R. I-2803 ¶ 24 (noting that services rendered by a company in one
member state to its branch in another member state are outside of the scope of
VAT).
143
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 45.
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Pooling of Regulatory Capital

Companies that use the SE to replace their subsidiaries with
branches reduce the amount of money that they must hold in
reserve.
The Solvency II Directive144 dictates how much
regulatory capital insurance and reinsurance companies must
maintain.145 Under the Directive, subsidiaries must set aside
their own funds, whereas money held by branches counts for the
parent company.146
Case 3: Sampo Life (Finland)
Sampo Life, the Finnish life insurance company, decreased
its pool of regulatory capital by adopting a branched SE
structure. It merged its Estonian, Lithuanian, and Latvian
subsidiaries into Sampo Life Insurance Baltic, an SE company
headquartered in Estonia and established new branches in
Latvia and Lithuania.147
The money the subsidiaries
independently held now counts for the company’s total reserves
because it is located in the SE’s branches.148
Use of the SE to absorb the subsidiaries, rather than the
Directive on Cross-Border Mergers, mitigated scrutiny of Sampo
Life from national supervisors.149 The SE signaled a legitimate,
European-level restructuring.150 As the CFO of a multinational
reinsurance company stated, “It’s much brighter to say we’re
becoming an SE—we consider Europe a unique market and we
will act through branches—than it is to say we’re pulling out our
subsidiaries.”151 Other interview subjects in the study similarly
characterized the SE as an important cover in carrying out

144

Council Directive 2009/138/EC, Solvency II Directive, 2009 O.J. (L 335) 1.
Id.
146
See id. (providing a formula for the calculation of solvency capital
requirements); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 20, location not indentified
(Feb. 12, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 30,
location not identified (Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 45.
147
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 57, a CFO of a multinational
reinsurance company, location not identified (Apr. 28, 2008) (on file with author).
148
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 56, location not identified (Mar. 3,
2008) (on file with author).
149
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 20.
150
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 57.
151
Id.
145
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reorganizations that would otherwise trouble clients and
regulators.152
Unlike Scor, however, Sampo Life Insurance Baltic could not
attain centralized regulation by transforming into a branched
SE. Consumer rights remain under national supervision.153
Sampo Life Insurance Baltic offers three different insurance
products in order to comply with varying national regulations.154
d.

Consolidation of Operations

The SE has also allowed companies to move between
Member States, enabling them to centralize their operations
without jeopardizing licenses they have previously acquired.155
Case 4: Swiss Re (Switzerland)
Swiss Re, the insurance and reinsurance multinational,
adopted the SE in order to gain access to EU legislation more
cheaply. Using the form, it shifted its insurance and reinsurance
business from their original Swiss headquarters to two new
Luxembourgian entities.156
The rules governing SEs enabled Swiss Re to consolidate its
insurance subsidiaries in Luxembourg without disturbing their

152
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 4, location not identified (Dec. 10,
2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 28, location not
identified (Feb. 21, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 30, location not identified (Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 34, location not identified (Feb. 6, 2008) (on file with author);
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 43, location not identified (Jan. 23, 2008) (on
file with author).
153
See Council Directive 1999/44, art. 4, 1999 O.J. (L 171) 12 (EC); Green Paper
on European Union Consumer Protection, at 7, COM (2001) 531 final (Oct. 2, 2001)
(“Considerable divergences exist in the laws applied to business-consumer
commercial practices in the internal market, whether resulting from national
specific regulations, differences in general principles or from different
jurisprudence.”); Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation
Concerning Sales Promotions in the Internal Market, at 7, COM (2001) 546 final
(Oct. 2, 2001) (blaming low cross-border consumer demand on national-level
regulation).
154
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 57.
155
Council Regulation 2157/2001, art. 8, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1, 4–5 (EC). Following
the transformation of the Tenth Directive, the cross-border merger is another
possible mechanism for reincorporating. It allows companies to merge into empty
companies in other jurisdictions.
156
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 64, location not identified (Apr. 25,
2008) (on file with author).
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licenses to conduct business in the U.S.157
The company
combined its Dutch and British subsidiaries into a British SE,
moved the SE to Luxembourg, and established a German
branch.158 British law does not provide for legal mergers, so the
company used a court-approved transfer of assets and liabilities
to join the subsidiaries.159 Completing the move without using
the SE form, however, would have required it to liquidate each
business, establish new companies in Luxembourg, and apply for
new licenses.160
Other companies, however, have undertaken similar
restructurings without the SE.
Partner Re, another
multinational reinsurance company, transferred its headquarters
from Switzerland to Ireland to qualify for the EU Reinsurance
Directives but did not convert to the SE.161 The company feared
exposure to employee representation and unpredictability in its
tax treatment, particularly its rights to offset losses in one
jurisdiction against its total profits.162 It also believed that
remedying gaps or problems in the legislation would require it to
petition national courts one at a time, rather than directly
lobbying a single body.163
Swiss Re also used the Directive on Cross-Border Mergers,
rather than the SE, to relocate its reinsurance subsidiaries. It
formed a private company in Luxembourg and has gradually
merged in the subsidiaries.164
2.

Drive To Harmonize Additional Areas of Law

To reach consensus on the SE, the Member States
harmonized only the specific aspects of corporate law on which
they could agree. While the framework design earned critical
political support, harmonizing some laws and not others has
allowed for national laws and regulations to interfere with

157

SE Regulation, supra note 10, art. 29.
Id.; see also Interview with Anonymous Source No. 65, location not identified
(Apr. 25, 2008) (on file with author).
159
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 64.
160
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 65.
161
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 64; see also Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 65.
162
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 43, location not identified (Jan. 23,
2008) (on file with author).
163
Id.
164
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 64.
158
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potential benefits from conversion to the form. Individual laws
can not easily be isolated from the broader systems within which
they operate. Without additional harmonization, it is unlikely
that the SE will attract many companies.
Companies in
regulated industries without regional supervisory systems have
few incentives to convert. Harmonizing additional areas of
corporate law is therefore essential to improving its viability, if
that is the primary goal.165
a.

Deposit Guarantees

Uncoordinated national deposit guarantee schemes have
discouraged European banks from converting to the SE. Banks
must contribute to funds guaranteeing their savings in every
Member State in which they operate.166 Each one has different
rules governing banks’ obligations.167 The differences attracted
attention in the wake of the failure of the Icelandic bank
Landesbanki. The British and Dutch governments had to loan
Iceland money to rescue depositors in the British and Dutch
branches of the bank.168

165
See, e.g., ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND
ECONOMIC FORCES, 1950–1957 xxxiii–xxxiv (1958) (positing spillover pressure to
expand authority of central institutions into neighboring policy sectors); Malcolm
Gammie, EU Taxation and the Societas Europaea—Harmless Creature or Trojan
Horse?, 44 EUR. TAX’N 35, 36 (2004).
166
Council Directive 94/19, arts. 3–4, 1994 O.J. (L 135) (EC).
167
For example, the Danish scheme guarantees a maximum of 300,000 Danish
Krone for ordinary deposits, the Swedish scheme guarantees a maximum of 250,000
Swedish Krona, and the Norwegian scheme guarantees a maximum of 2,000,000
Norwegian Krone. IMF, FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN THE NORDIC-BALTIC REGION:
CHALLENGES FOR FINANCIAL POLICIES 52–53 (2007), available at http://www.
imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2007/nordbal/pdf/0607.pdf. In Denmark, a bank
makes current payments but is repaid them on withdrawal. See generally
DANMARKS NATIONAL BANK, PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN DENMARK (2005), available at
http://www.nationalbanken.dk/DNUK/Publications.nsf/8b8fe2a60c3a10cbc1256be50
057a78e/1e8fec8f259e61ffc125706c003d4409/$FILE/kap19.html.
In
Finland,
Norway, and Sweden, banks pay nonrefundable premiums. See Jean Dermine,
European Banking Integration: Don’t Put the Cart Before the Horse, 58 tbl.12
(INSEAD, Fontainebleau, Sept. 17, 2005), available at http://www.insead.edu/
facultyresearch/faculty/personal/jdermine/research/documents/Chicago2005Dermine
DraftII_000.pdf.
168
See JAMES K. JACKSON, ICELAND’S FINANCIAL CRISIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.
3–4 (Mar. 11, 2010), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=
U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA516392; John Goddard, Phil Molyneux & John
O.S. Wilson, The Financial Crisis in Europe: Evolution, Policy Responses and
Lessons for the Future, 17 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 362, 368 (2009); Michael
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Case 5: Nordea Bank (Sweden)
Nordea Bank, the largest financial services group in the
Nordic and Baltic regions, publicized its intention to become an
SE in 2003.169 It planned to convert in order to integrate its
subsidiaries into a Swedish SE and operate through branches.
The branched structure would confer centralized supervision,
savings in compliance and governance expenses, and a larger
lending base.170 Although banks may not loan more than ten
percent of their total capital to a single customer, money held by
branches counts toward the total, while money held in
subsidiaries does not.171 The financial crisis has, however, raised
questions over the desirability of allowing large, verticallyintegrated banks that operate through branches. If they fail,
individual countries may not have enough money to bail them
out.
Nordea never completed the conversion because of costs
arising from national deposit gaurantee schemes.172 If Nordea
had become an SE, all of its European deposits would have
shifted to the Swedish parent company, along with the risks
associated with them.173 The funds that Nordea had already
invested in the other countries’ systems, however, would not have
flowed with the deposits to Sweden.174 This constrained Nordea’s
plans, as it had already allocated substantial funds in the
countries’ schemes.175
Nordea petitioned the European
Commission for a harmonized, European-level system of deposit

Waibel, Bank Insolvency and Sovereign Insolvency, in CROSS-BORDER BANK
INSOLVENCY (Rosa Maria Lastra ed., 2011).
169
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 7, location not identified (Feb. 1, 2008)
(on file with author).
170
The Second Banking Directive, Directive 89/646/EEC, allows for home
country supervision of foreign bank branches under a single license. Foreign bank
subsidiaries continue to be regulated by their host state. See ALFRED LEWIS & GIOIA
PESCETTO, EU AND US BANKING IN THE 1990S 12–13 (1996).
171
Council Regulation 2531/98, art. 4, 1998 O.J. (L 318) 1; see also Interview
with Anonymous Source No. 7.
172
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 8, location not identified (Feb. 1, 2008)
(on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 27, location not
identified (Feb. 5, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No.
33, location not identified (Feb. 4, 2008) (on file with author).
173
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 7.
174
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 8.
175
Id.

WF_Kirshner(with Figures).doc (Do Not Delete)4/13/11 5:23 PM

1306

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1273

guarantees, but issues of national sovereignty in banking
regulation have so far prevented the Member States from
reaching a solution.176
b.

National Regulatory Systems and Attitudes

Further harmonization would also be necessary for the SE
to
attract
companies
in
other
industries, including
telecommunications and pharmaceuticals. Telecommunications
companies do not receive any benefits from using the SE to adopt
a branched structure. They must operate a subsidiary in every
country in which they do business.177 Member States license
individual companies, not branches, to operate at specific
frequencies.178 Pharmaceutical companies must register their
drugs for use within individual Member States in accordance
with expensive procedures.179 Allianz, despite becoming an SE,
left its Italian subsidiary in place because Italy allows only
independent, Italian license holders to underwrite insurance
there.180
Persistent protectionism has led to additional obstacles. A
lawyer counseled an executive search company not to convert to
the SE because regulators in Eastern Europe would block the
conversion of Eastern European subsidiaries into branches,
viewing the restructuring as a way to take money out of the
region.181 Companies House, the government register of British
companies, notified an Austrian SE that it could not establish a

176

Interview with Anonymous Source No. 7.
“Telecommunications companies do not receive any benefits from using the
SE to adopt a branched structure,” according to a representative of a Swedish
telecommunications company in an interview for the study. Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 48, location not identified (Feb. 18, 2008) (on file with
author). “They must operate a subsidiary in every country in which they do
business,” the representative said. Id.
178
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 46, location not identified (Feb. 19,
2008) (on file with author).
179
“Pharmaceutical companies,” according to the lawyer of a German
multinational pharmaceutical company, “must register their drugs for use within
individual Member States in accordance with expensive procedures.” Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 44, location not identified (Jan. 23, 2008) (on file with
author).
180
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 21, location not identified (Jan. 21,
2008) (on file with author).
181
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 47, location not identified (Feb. 18,
2008) (on file with author).
177
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branch in England.182 The suggestion that PepsiCo might buy
Danone caused French politicians to retain the national “jewel”
for France.183 In 2007, the German energy company E.ON
dropped its bid for Endesa, a Spanish utility company, after the
Spanish government opposed the deal in favor of a rival bid from
another Spanish company.184
The European Commission
criticized the actions of Spain to thwart the merger, and referred
the case to the European Court of Justice.185 “Europe continues
to fight yesterday’s battles; there is very little community of
purpose,” stated one policy analyst.186
c.

Corporate Taxation

Significantly more companies would adopt the SE if it offered
a system of unified taxation.187 The deficiency in the SE
legislation has energized discussions of how best to organize
corporate taxation at the European level.188 A proposal called the
182
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 53, location not identified (Mar. 19,
2008) (on file with author).
183
See generally Gillian G.H. Garcia, Sovereignty v. Soundness: CrossBorder/Inter-State Banking in the European Union and the United States:
Similarities, Differences and Policy Issues, 27 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 109 (2009);
Deborah Orr, Danone: Not For Sale, FORBES (July 25, 2007, 1:45 PM EST),
http://www.forbes.com/2005/07/25/danone-pepsi-takeover-cz_do_0725danone.html.
184
Carter Dougherty, E.ON Lowers Its Sights in Bid for Endesa After Enel’s
Entry, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 7, 2007, at 14.
185
Id.
186
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 15, a policy analyst, location not
identified (Feb. 7, 2008) (on file with author).
187
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 2, location not identified (Dec. 5, 2007)
(on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 4, location not identified
(Dec. 10, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 5,
location not identified (Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 9, location not identified (Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with author);
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 25, location not identified (Feb. 4, 2008) (on
file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 29, location not identified
(Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 32,
location not identified (Feb. 4, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 33, location not identified (Feb. 4, 2008) (on file with author);
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 40, location not identified (Feb. 22, 2008) (on
file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 42, location not identified
(Mar. 18, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 51,
location not identified (May 20, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 66, location not identified (Mar. 11, 2008) (on file with
author).
188
See, e.g., Roopa Aitken & Chris Morgan, Societas Europaea: Is Tax an
Incentive or a Barrier?, 15 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1343, 1347 (2004) (“Because the
introduction of the SE will not eliminate the current tax problems faced by
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Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (“CCCTB”) has
received the most popular support,189 and most companies
interviewed in the study favor it.190
The absence of harmonized tax provisions has been
including
by
the
European
extensively
criticized,191
192
Commission.
Operating across uncoordinated national tax
regimes subjects companies to double taxation and under
taxation, overly tax-driven arrangements, and extra compliance
costs.193 Currently, each country taxes companies’ subsidiaries

multinational groups, its introduction has fuelled the debate for a more tax efficient
method for operating within Europe.”).
The adoption of the European Company . . . has made it more urgent to
define the tax framework at the European Union level. To become an
attractive vehicle, it is not enough to ensure that the existing body of
European Union tax company legislation is fully applicable to the
European Company. The full benefits in establishing a European Company
may only be achieved if existing companies can form such a company
without any imposition of additional tax pre-incorporation expenses and
avoid the outstanding tax obstacles impeding their cross-border operations.
TAVARES & BILREIRO, supra note 8, at 176–77.
189
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 247 (Bela Balassa ed., 1975) (“Although
the Treaty of Rome does not contain specific provisions on the harmonization of
[business] taxes, Article 100 of the Treaty may be interpreted as a mandate for
harmonization.”).
190
See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee: Towards an Internal Market
Without Tax Obstacles: A Strategy for Providing Companies with a Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base for Their EU-wide Activities, COM (2001) 582 final at 15–19.
“[T]he Commission has proposed testing the consolidated EU tax base with a
European Company pilot programme.” 1 THE EUROPEAN COMPANY 99 (Dirk van
Gerven & Paul Storm eds., 2006).
191
See, e.g., Gammie, supra note 165; Frits Bolkestein, Commissioner The New
European Company: Opportunity in Diversity, in THE EUROPEAN COMPANY,
DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY LAW OF CORPORATIONS 43–44 (Jonathan Rickford ed.,
2003); Celia Hampton, European Company Law Reforms Make Uneven Progress,
EUROWATCH, Mar. 15, 2002, at 1.
192
Frits Bolkestein, Member of the Eur. Comm’n in Charge of the Internal Mkt.
and Taxation, Address to Conference at the University of Leiden: The New
European Company: Opportunity in Diversity (Nov. 29, 2002).
I concede that work remains to be done in some areas: in particular, I refer
to the taxation aspects, which, quite rightly, are of concern to potential
users . . . . This leaves the SE-Statute without any tax rules. This is a
rather unfortunate situation, which I regret very much. Clearly, the lack of
appropriate tax rules significantly reduces the practical attractiveness of
the European Company Statute. Business representatives emphasize this
quite forcefully.
Id.
193
Marjaana Helminen, The Tax Treatment of the Running of an SE, 44 EUR.
TAX’N 28, 30 (2004).

WF_Kirshner(with Figures).doc (Do Not Delete)4/13/11 5:23 PM

2010]

“AN EVER CLOSER UNION”

1309

and branches individually, and companies have no ability to
consolidate their overall profits and losses.194
Leaving taxation to national law, however, helped secure the
passage of the SE legislation.195 Member States with low
corporate tax rates—including Estonia, with no tax on retained
earnings; Ireland, with a twelve and a half percent tax rate; and
Slovakia, with a seventeen percent tax rate—would not have
supported legislation that would have elimated their competitive
advantages in regard to corporate taxation.196
The CCCTB does not affect national tax rates. It simply sets
out a common definition for what constitutes a taxable profit and
procedures for allocating the profit among the Member States.197
Under the proposed system, a company would aggregate its total
income according to a uniform set of rules for deductions and
other accounting issues, assign the income proportionally among
the locations in which it operated, and pay taxes according to
national rates.198
3.

U.S. Comparison

The U.S. has developed a complex regulatory regime with
competences split between federal, state, and local levels.

194
See, e.g., Roderik Bouwman & Jan Werbrouck, International Tax Aspects of
the Societas Europaea, in 1 THE EUROPEAN COMPANY, supra note 190, at 98, 102.
The absence of special tax provisions in the Regulation, coupled with the
principle of equal treatment, means an SE is subject to the tax laws of the
Member State of which it is considered a resident for tax purposes and,
when operating internationally, applicable international regulations,
treaties, and the laws of the (Member) States in which it operates.
Consequently, as a tax resident of the EU, an SE is potentially subject to
the tax laws of [thirty] countries.
Id.
195
See, e.g., Pieter Sanders, The European Company, 1968 J. BUS. L. 184, 189
(“The creation of a European company is one thing, the solution of the tax problems
involved is another.”).
196
CTR. FOR EUR. POLICY STUDIES, CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE EUROPEAN
COMPANY STATUTE 23 (2008); see also Daniel Shaviro, Some Observations
Concerning Multijurisdictional Tax Competition, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 15, at 51–52 (“A
related Tiebout argument would suggest that tax competition permits jurisdictions
to specialize in catering to diverse consumer preferences or local needs, such as by
collectively offering a choice between high-tax, high-service and low-tax, low-service
options.”).
197
See Emrah Arbak, Will the CCCTB Be Stillborn?, CTR FOR EUR. POLICY
STUDIES, Feb. 21, 2008, available at http://shop.ceps.eu/book/will-ccctb-be-stillborn.
198
See id.
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Constitutionally, states may issue laws and regulations on any
The federal
topic that federal law has not preempted.199
government may also delegate the authority to implement
federal regulatory programs to the states.200
The U.S. has centralized an increasing amount of regulatory
power at the federal level.201 Professor Mark J. Roe detailed the
areas of corporate law that the federal government has
expropriated from the states:
Federal securities laws in the 1930s took much of voting away
from the states, set up the means to take insider trading away
from the states, and mandated delivery of information to
shareholders . . . . In the 1950s, the SEC federalized the proxy
contests . . . . The 1960s witnessed the first successful hostile
takeover, which Congress sought to impede with the Williams
Act.
And federal authorities effectively grabbed hold of specific but
ordinary corporate matters in the 1970s: the rules governing the
going private transaction—the central corporate transaction of
that era—were partially federalized . . . [; state] law allowed
selective stock buybacks [and the SEC reversed it] . . . [; the
states allowed] voting discrepancies among shareholders [but
the stock exchanges under SEC pressure reversed them] . . . .
[For a time] the circuit courts were . . . turning corporate
fiduciary law . . . into federal law. While that [diminished, some
still remains] . . . .

199
See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947).
Commercial law is an area of concurrent jurisdiction. See Ernest A. Young, Dual
Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 139, 150–52 (2001). Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law will
govern when the federal government acts. See Philip J. Weiser, Towards a
Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665–66
(2001). For further information about the various ways in which the federal
government can preempt the states, see JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONGRESSIONAL
PREEMPTION: REGULATORY FEDERALISM (2005).
200
See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and ‘Dual Sovereignty’ Doesn’t, 96
MICH. L. REV. 813, 866–68 (1998); Weiser, supra note 199, at 671.
201
See, e.g., REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 15, at xviii (“For most of the twentieth
century, power and regulatory responsibility shifted inexorably from the states to
Washington. But, over the past two decades, ‘new federalists’ have argued for a
reallocation of regulatory authority from the federal government back to the states
and even to local government.”); Landau, supra note 9; U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL REGULATION OF STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS: THE MIXED RECORD OF THE 1980S (1993).
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[N]ew securities rules [in the 1990s] obliterated parallel state
law [by expressly preempting the states.] And Sarbanes-Oxley,
reflecting congressional urgency [in 2002] to react to the Enron
scandals, [mandates] a host of corporate governance matters—
from the power of the audit committee to [management
construction of] internal control systems, to the micro-details of
loans to managers . . . . [A]ll [these were] once province[s] of
state law.202

As regards bank deposit guarantees, the Glass Steagall Act
of 1933203 established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”), which guarantees the checking and savings deposits of
state and federally chartered banks at the federal level.204 The
Act was designed to restore public trust in the banking system
following the Great Depression.205 To qualify for its protections,
banks must comply with specific liquidity and reserve
requirements.206 Bank failures during the 1980s and 1990s
tested the FDIC system. While no serious bank runs occurred,
taxpayers and surviving banks paid $36 billion to support failed
banks, and regulators allowed profitable banks to enter
speculative real estate deals.207
Corporate taxation in the U.S. occurs at both the federal and
state level. Tax revenues have played an important role in state
finances. The 1870 federal census indicates that Connecticut,
Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania earned more than half their total tax revenues
from companies.208
The expansion in out-of-state markets,
through catalog sales and the internet, has made apportionment
of tax revenues among states increasingly difficult.209
To
202

Roe, supra note 22, at 646.
The Glass Steagall Act is the popular name for sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of
the Banking Act of 1933, which has since been repealed. It is codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (seventh), 78, 377, 378(a) (2006).
204
See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND
REGULATION 22–23 (1992); Lewis & Pescetto, supra note 170, at 73.
205
See, e.g., Jonathan Zubrow Cohen, The Mellon Bank Order: An Unjustifiable
Expansion of Banking Powers, 8 ADMIN. L. REV. AM. U. 335, 336 n.3 (1994).
206
12 U.S.C. §24 (Seventh) (2006 & Supp. II).
207
FDIC, 1 HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES, LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S 25 (1997).
208
See FRANCIS A. WALKER, U.S. CENSUS OFFICE, THE NINTH CENSUS 640
(1872).
209
See generally Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (holding that
the Commerce Clause requires physical presence in state for sales and use taxes);
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (holding that states may
203

WF_Kirshner(with Figures).doc (Do Not Delete)4/13/11 5:23 PM

1312

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1273

increase their revenues, the states have considered adopting a
combined reporting system that would allow states that provide
services to out-of-state companies to levy taxes and would create
a process for coordinating corporate tax policies.210
Both the U.S. and Europe appear to be moving towards
increased centralization and regionalization in law and face
similar challenges in coordinating multi-level regimes for modern
companies.
B.

Introducing Regulatory Competition?

Although the original purpose of the SE was to provide
companies with a unified body of European law,211 the myriad
references to national law in the final legislation212 combine
with the ability that it affords companies to reincorporate213 to
create new opportunities for Member States to compete for
incorporations. Many commentators therefore predicted that the
SE would introduce a more American-style commercial market to
Europe.214 In reality, many factors constrain companies from
using the SE as a vehicle for regulatory competition, and only
minimal inter-state arbitrage has resulted.
Unlike the U.S., which allows companies to incorporate and
reincorporate in any state they choose, regardless of the
connections that they have to it,215 the EU has long sought to
prevent competition for corporate charters among the Member
States.216 European policymakers have believed that the creation

not impose taxes on corporations of other states disproportionate to their contacts
with the taxing state).
210
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TAX POLICY HANDBOOK FOR
STATE LEGISLATORS 37, 43 (2d ed. 2003).
211
See 1970 Draft Statute, supra note 82.
212
SE Regulation, supra note 10, arts. 4(3), 13, 15(1), 47(1), 51, 52(1)–(2), 53,
54(1)–(2), 57, 59(1), 61, 62(1)–(2).
213
Id. art. 8; see also TAVARES & BILREIRO, supra note 8, at 11.
214
See, e.g., Bouloukos, supra note 20, at 549; McCahery & Vermeulen, supra
note 20; Stith, supra note 20.
215
See Ribstein, supra note 58, at 825–27. The states must recognize
corporations incorporated in other jurisdictions, and the law of the state of
incorporation governs disputes, wherever they may occur.
216
See, e.g., Robert R. Drury, The “Delaware Syndrome”: European Fears and
Reactions, 6 J. BUS. L. 709, 723 (2005). See generally Heine & Kerber, supra note 9,
at 47; RAYMOND CANNON, BUSINESS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNIONA PRACTICE
GUIDE § 6.01(1) (1996); Alfred F. Conard, The European Alternative to Uniformity in
Corporation Laws, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2150, 2161 (1991) (“The founders of the
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of a “race” among the Member States217 would encourage overlypermissive regulation,218 rather than promote innovation. Most
Member States have blocked companies from relocating219 by
requiring them to register in the same place in which they
establish their headquarters.220
The SE, however, made it legal221 for companies to
reincorporate.222 According to article 8 of the SE Regulation:
Community had no intention of letting one of the member states become the
‘Delaware of Europe.’ ”).
217
See Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558–59 (1933) (noting that Justice Brandeis
coined the phrase “race to the bottom”); see also Catherine Barnard, Social Dumping
and the Race to the Bottom: Some Lessons for the European Union from Delaware, 25
EUR. L. REV. 57, 61 (2000).
218
See, e.g., Stefan Grundmann, Regulatory Competition in European Company
Law—Some Different Genius?, in CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE AGE OF THE EURO:
CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS, LISTED COMPANIES AND REGULATION 561, 562–63,
565 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2002); Jan Wouters, European Company Law: Quo
Vadis?, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 257, 269 (2000).
219
See Treaty of Rome, supra note 40, arts. 54(3)(g) (now TEC art. 44(3)(g)), 220
(now TEC art. 293); Luca Enriques, Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered:
What Role for the EC? 5 (Univ. of Bologna, Working Paper No. 53/2005, 2005),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=850005.
220
See, e.g., ADRIAAN DORRESTEIJN ET AL., EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW 20
(1995); Mathias Siems, Convergence, Competition, Centros and Conflicts of Law:
European Company Law in the 21st Century, 27 EUR. L. REV. 47, 48 (2002). See
generally THE EUROPEAN FOUNDATION: A NEW LEGAL APPROACH (Klaus J. Hopt et
al. eds., 2006).
221
Following the transformation of the Tenth Directive, the cross-border merger
is another possible mechanism for reincorporating. It allows companies to merge
into empty companies in other jurisdictions.
222
Most national legislatures providing for the international transfer of seat
require
that the transfer to another Member State of a company registered in their
territory—and consequently subject to their laws—should be accompanied
by the dissolution of the company at stake, as well as the constitution of the
company in the Member State of arrival according to its national laws. This
operation implies a change of the applicable law to the company, and
therefore, the loss of its legal personality. Without the continuity of the
legal personality of the company, there is in reality no transfer of seat, but
a sole dissolution and subsequent re-formation of the company.
See, e.g., TAVARES & BILREIRO, supra note 8, at 50.
For decades, the transfer of the seat of a company has been the subject of
controversy in European company law. Although the subject was expressly
mentioned in the European Treaty, experts have not been able to agree on
a workable solution. Also, in most States, national company law has not
been able to come forward with acceptable solutions. As a consequence,
companies were prevented from enjoying the same freedom of movement as
natural persons, and this notwithstanding their express assimilation in the
Treaty.
Wymeersch, supra note 8, at 661 (internal citations omitted).
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“The registered office of an SE may be transferred to another
Member State . . . [and] shall not result in the winding up of the
SE or in the creation of a new legal person.”223 The provision
allows Member States to compete in the legal fields the SE leaves
to national law, which include directors’ liability, insolvency,
auditing, and criminal rules.
Few companies have actually used the SE to move and take
advantage of differences in national legal systems. Based on my
empirical data, it appears that several factors dissuade them.
The companies that have reincorporated have done so for unique
reasons and others that are similar and have transformed into
SEs have not moved. The complete legislation and the context in
which it operates limit the benefits that companies can attain
from relocating.224
1.

Preconditions

Article 7 of the SE Regulation discourages companies from
moving.225 It requires them to locate their registered office and
head office in the same Member State, in line with the real seat
principle.226 Many companies I interviewed explained that they
would have considered reincorporating if they did not also have
to move their headquarters.227

223

See SE Regulation, supra note 10, art. 8.
See, e.g., Heine & Kerber, supra note 9, at 64 (“[D]ue to the above-mentioned
path dependences much time will be needed, before a dynamic competition process
can develop, and it can be expected that this competition will have to tackle with a
whole set of serious problems.”).
225
SE Regulation, supra note 10, art. 7.
226
Although the ECJ seemed to suggest in Centros that the real seat theory
might contravene the right to free establishment, in 2009 the ECJ affirmed the
legality of the theory in the Cartesio case. See Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és
Szolgáltató bt, 2008 E.C.R. I-9641.
227
See Interview with Anonymous Source No. 2, location not identified (Dec. 5,
2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 4, location not
identified (Dec. 10, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 5, location not identified (Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 9, location not identified (Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with author);
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 10, location not identified (Dec. 11, 2007) (on
file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 16, location not identified
(Dec. 12, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 17,
location not identified (Dec. 13, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 27, location not identified (Feb. 5, 2008) (on file with author);
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 29, location not identified (Jan. 22, 2008) (on
file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 30, location not identified
(Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 46,
224
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Transferring headquarters to a different country is difficult
for companies. Smaller companies tend to be embedded in their
local economies, and sufficient numbers of their employees may
not be willing to move to other Member States.228 Larger
companies tend to have political ties to their countries, and
relocating may carry political consequences.229 Moving a head
office can also attract negative publicity.230 A representative of a
Finnish company stated that it considered moving its
headquarters to avoid lenient mandatory bidding requirements
in Finland231 but decided not to because “headquarters are
political.”232
Case Study 6: Narada (Norway)
Narada, the battery manufacturing company originally
based in Norway, moved an SE company from Norway to the UK,
in the absence of such concerns. It structured a joint venture
with its main customer, the Norwegian telecommunications

location not identified (Feb. 19, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 74, location not identified (Apr. 28, 2008) (on file with
author). But see Enriques, supra note 16, at 80 (“The provision requiring the SE’s
registered office to be located in the same Member State as its central
administration . . . should be no serious obstacle to using the SE as a vehicle for
company law shopping.”).
228
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global
Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641,
655 (1999) (“Language and culture are important constraints. Even after the
Common Market, Europe is criss-crossed by national borders that, as a social
matter, restrict the mobility of labor. Hence, labor is more resistant to corporate
migration in Europe than in the United States.”).
229
See, e.g., Stith, supra note 20, at 1611.
230
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence
in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 129 (1999)
(discussing “sources of path dependence in a country’s patterns of corporate
ownership structure”).
231
In Finland, a shareholder’s obligation to make an offer for all of a listed
company’s outstanding shares had not been triggered until the shareholder attained
two-third of total voting power, a very high threshold. See Securities Market Act
(1989/495) chap. 10, § 4 (Fin.), superseded by Council Directive 2004/25, art. 1, 2004
O.J. (L 142) 12 (EC). When Finland implemented the EU Takeover Directive in Bill
HE 6/2006, it reduced its mandatory bid rule to a dual threshold of 30% and 50% of
voting rights.
232
See Interview with Anonymous Source No. 46.
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company Eltek, as an SE to allow for flexibility to hire staff in
any country in Europe. After selecting a British manager, it
transferred the SE to the UK.233
2.

Costs

Exit taxes, dissenters’ rights, and labor negotiations increase
the cost of using the SE to move. Many companies initially
interested in reincorporating have found the process to be too
expensive after a full investigation of the requirements. Those
that have moved have contributed to the convergence of the laws
of the Member States.
While the SE eliminates legal barriers to relocating,234 the
legislation does not address obstacles posed by national
taxation.235 Taxes that Member States levy on exiting companies
challenge their freedom of movement.236 Germany, for example,
requires companies that relocate to pay full liquidation taxes.237
Only one Member State, Portugal, does not charge exit taxes.238
233
See Interview with Anonymous Source No. 69, location not identified (Mar.
12, 2008) (on file with author).
234
See Council Regulation 2157/2001, art. 8(1), 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1, 4.
235
Case C-9/02, Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministere de l’Economie,
2004 E.C.R. 1-2409, however, has raised questions over the legality of exit taxes.
While the European Court of Justice made a clear distinction between people and
corporations, it held that France could not charge exiting residents taxes that it did
not apply to domestic residents without violating the Freedom of Establishment. See
id. at 1-2409 [70].
236
See, e.g., Bouwman & Werbrouck, supra note 194, at 104; see also TAVARES &
BILREIRO, supra note 8, at 161.
[Despite] Article 8 of the Regulation . . . , the majority of the Member
States continue to tax such transfer as if the company was being wounded
up or liquidated.
The reason for this widespread practice is that, in most Member States,
with the transfer of the company’s registered office to another Member
State, i.e., the host State, the SE will cease to be subject to unlimited tax
liability in the home country. Therefore the objective is to prevent any
capital gains, which have accrued in the home State, evading taxation. The
taxation of capital gains upon the transfer of the company’s registered
office to another Member State is the last chance to tax the appreciation
and gains in such assets upon their actual transfer.
Id. For additional authority, see Anne Fairpo, Societas Europaea and Mobility, 892
TAX J. 24, 24 (2007).
237
See Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] [Income Tax Act], Oct. 19, 2002, BGBI. I
at 4210, § 95 (Ger.), available at http://www.bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/
estg/gesamt.pdf.
238
See INT’L BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, SURVEY ON THE SOCIETAS
EUROPAEA 26 (2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/
documents/survey.pdf.
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A 2005 European directive,239 however, allows companies that
maintain a presence to which their assets can be attributed for
continuing taxation to defer their payment of capital gains.240
Case Study 7: Prosafe (Norway)
Prosafe, the Norwegian shipping company, found it
expensive to use the SE to reincorporate.241 The company moved
to Cyprus to avoid changes to the national tonnage tax system in
Norway.242 In 1996, Norway adopted a permissive scheme of
tonnage taxation to enable the country to develop as a
competitive shipping base.243 It did not tax the operating profits
of companies unless they paid taxable dividends to shareholders
or moved their assets out of the country.244 In September 2006,
however, the government announced a new plan to reclaim the
tax credits. It demanded payment on all tax liabilities deferred
under the 1996 law over a period of ten years and moved to
impose forward taxes on shipping companies.245
Prosafe paid the full amount of its deferred tax liabilities
when it left Norway.246 Since the reincorporation, Norway has
239

Directive 2005/19/EC, amending Council Directive 90/434/EEC on a common
system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfer of assets and exchanges
of shares concerning companies of different Member States. Directive 2005/19/EC,
2005 O.J. (L 58) 19.
240
Id. tit. IVb, arts. 10b–10d.
241
The SE enabled Prosafe to avoid the capital gains taxes it shareholders would
have paid, though, had it needed to establish a brand new company in Cyprus, buy
it, and liquidate the Norwegian company. By using the SE, Prosafe could continue
business without interruption. See Paul Storm, The Societas Europaea: A New
Opportunity?, in 1 THE EUROPEAN COMPANY, supra note 190, at 3, 11 (detailing
cumbersome administrative procedures for moving a head office but emphasizing the
lack of need to wind up the old company or create a new legal personality).
242
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 52, location not identified (Feb. 21,
2008) (on file with author).
243
“The special rules for taxation of shipping companies were adopted with
effect as from 1996 and laid down in section 51A of the law on wealth and income
tax No. 8 of 18 August 1911. . . . The rates of the tonnage tax were set out in chapter
5 of the Annual Tax Decree by the Parliament.” EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Norway,
143/03/COL (2006). For a discussion of the changes in 2006 to the tonnage tax
system that had been in place in Norway since 1996, see Wikborg Rein’s Shipping
Offshore: Update 1/2008, at 28, available at http://www.wr.no/storage/
Magasiner/SO_1_2008_screen.pdf.
244
See Lov om Skatt av Formue og Inntekt (Law on Wealth and Income Tax)
§ 51A, no. 8 (Aug. 18, 1911).
245
See Press Release, Ministry of Finance, Proposed Amendments to the
Norwegian Special Tax Regime for Shipping Companies (Oct. 9, 2007).
246
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 52.
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passed additional legislation taxing exiting companies as if their
full valuation has been realized.247 Odjfell, another Norwegian
shipping company, converted to the SE in order to leave Norway
but so far remains incorporated there.248
The SE legislation also authorizes Member States to
adopt procedures for compensating shareholders who oppose
reincorporation and to establish protections for creditors.249 The

247
“In 2007 Norway introduced new exit taxation rules adopting a new section
10-71 of the Tax Act, making SE companies subject to an exit tax when moving their
effective management or tax residency from Norway to another country. On March
10 2010, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (“ESA”) issued a letter of formal notice to
Norway for failing to comply with its obligation under articles 31, 34 and 40 of the
Agreement on the European Economic Area (“EEA”) by imposing an immediate
taxation on companies that transfer their seat or assets and liabilities to another
EEA state and on the shareholders of such companies and for breach of the SE
Regulation.” ESA Issues Formal Notice About Exit Tax, INT’L TAX R., June 1, 2010,
at 88.
Effective from 7 October 2008 new exit tax rules were implemented in
Norway. Pursuant to these rules exit tax will be levied when tangible or
intangible assets are moved out of the Norwegian tax jurisdiction, based on
the market value of the assets. However, if the assets are moved within the
EEA, the tax payable on tangible assets (except for merchandise) may be
deferred provided: (i) the assets maintain within the EEA and (ii) there is a
tax treaty in force between the EEA Member State and Norway, which
provides for the exchange of information and assistance in regard to
collection of tax. The exit tax for tangible assets is annulled if the asset is
not realised within five years. For intangible assets and merchandise the
exit tax is definitive and is payable on the day of exit. This rule also applies
on emigration of a company from Norway. If a company ceases to be a
resident in Norway for tax purposes under the Norwegian Tax Act section
2-2 or under a tax treaty, the emigration from Norway will mean that
gains/loss on the assets are subject to tax/are tax deductible as if the asset
or liability was realised. However, if the company continues to be subject to
tax in Norway through a permanent establishment after the emigration, no
capital gains taxation will take place after the exit. Such tax exemption is
only available on application to the Ministry of Finance under section 11-21
of the Norwegian Tax Act. The emigration of a company will also be
considered as a realisation on the hands of the shareholders at the time of
exit.
KPMG, TAX FACTS NORWAY 2009: A SURVEY OF THE NORWEGIAN TAX SYSTEM 20,
available at http://www.kpmg.no/arch/_img/9484126.pdf.
248
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 54, location not identified (Mar. 6,
2008) (on file with author).
249
See Council Regulation 2157/2001, art. 8(2)–(4), 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1, 5 (EC)
(endowing creditors with prior information rights); id. art. 8(16) (allowing creditors
to litigate claims arising prior to the transfer in the departure State); id. art. 8(15)
(blocking transfers when proceedings for winding up, liquidation, insolvency, or
suspension of payments have taken place). Council Regulation 2157/2001, art. 8(7),
2001 O.J. (L 294) 1, 5, (EC) also allows Member States to legislate additional rules.
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cost of complying is unpredictable, making it difficult for
companies to evaluate the merits of a potential move.
Furthermore, the formula that the SE Directive sets out for
negotiating employee representation carries additional costs.
Employees from different countries have varied experience in
participating in labor negotiations, and the process can be
unwieldy in practice.
Case Study 8: Elcoteq (Finland)
Elcoteq, the electronics manufacturing company previously
located in Finland, and the main supplier to Nokia, the Finnish
electronics company, was the first company in Europe to convert
to the SE for the purpose of moving its headquarters.250 In 2005,
Elcoteq’s shareholders approved the reincorporation of the
company in Luxembourg.251
It merged its Finnish parent
company with its Luxembourgian subsidiary to create a
Luxembourgian SE and then established branches in
Switzerland and Finland.252 The new company retained its
original Estonian and Hungarian subsidiaries.253
Elcoteq had difficulties recruiting talented employees to
Finland.254 At the time of the conversion, only one percent of the
company’s workforce lived in Finland, and most of its officers
worked from Switzerland.255
The bilateral tax treaty between Luxembourg and
Switzerland, however, primarily motivated the move.256 The
treaty eliminates taxes at the level of the head office on income
the company allocates to the Swiss branch. Interest on loans
provided by the Swiss branch also qualify as a cost for tax
purposes, reducing the company’s overall taxable income.257
For example, under SE-Ausfuhrungsgestz [SEAG], Dec. 12, 2004, BGBl. I, § 13(1)
(Ger.), creditors are entitled to a deposit security.
250
See Interview with Anonymous Source No. 63, location not identified (Mar. 8,
2008) (on file with author).
251
See id.
252
See id.
253
See id.
254
See id.
255
See id.
256
See id.; see also Aitken & Morgan, supra note 188 (stating that because tax
treatment of an SE is equivalent to that of a national private limited company “the
relevant double tax treaties concluded between the country and other countries will
apply to an SE”).
257
See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 196, at 58–59.
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Shareholders who opposed the move had the right to sell
their shares to the company.258 Elcoteq could not determine in
advance how many shareholders would object and therefore how
much the reincorporation would cost.259 The SE legislation also
did not address whether the dissenting shareholders were
entitled to the average share price during the time period leading
up to the shareholder vote or the price on the day of the vote.260
The move from Finland to Luxembourg stimulated
convergence in the countries’ laws.261 Like most of Europe, but
not Luxembourg, Finland does not prescribe a nominal share
value.262 During negotiations related to the move, Luxembourg
repealed its rules, aligning itself with the rest of the continent.263
Luxembourg has also legislated a “one share-one vote”
requirement,264 while Finland has not.265 Elcoteq amended its
share structure to comply with Luxembourg’s rule.266 The
[T]he main mechanism for such [non-mandatory] harmonization is a web of
more than 1,500 bilateral tax treaties that provide complicated rules for
coordinating the claims of ‘source’ countries where income is earned and
‘residence’ countries where business owners are found. However, rather
than emerging spontaneously without broader harmonizing institutions,
these treaties generally follow, in their broad outlines, a set of model
treaties first developed in the 1920s through intensive multilateral
negotiations under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce
and the League of Nations. The global setting of these agreements lowered
transaction costs for individual countries to agree on specific terms of
mutual forbearance. In addition, to businesses that were anxious to avoid
double taxation, the global institutions offered a forum at once more
favourable than national politics and yet able to be leveraged into such
politics through the argument: this is what everyone else is doing; you’d
better join the club.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
258
See Interview with Anonymous Source No. 63.
259
See id.
260
See id.
261
See, e.g., Simon Deakin, Regulatory Competition Versus Harmonisation in
European Company Law 1–3 (ESRC Centre for Bus. Research, Working Paper No.
163, 2000) (questioning whether regulatory competition strengthens diversity or
leads to convergence).
262
See Osakeyhtiölaki [Limited Liability Companies Act] (624/2006) ch. 3, § 5(2),
(3) (Fin.), available at http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2006/en20060624.pdf
(unofficial translation) [hereinafter LLCA].
263
See Loi du 10 août 1915 Concernant Les Societes Commerciales, modifié avec
effet 31 déc. 2006 [Law of Aug. 10, 1915 Concerning Commercial Companies,
amended with effect Dec. 31, 2006], SERVICE CENTRAL DE LEGISLATION (Lux.).
264
See id. § IV, art. 46.
265
See Limited Liability Companies Act, supra note 262, ch. 3, §§ 1(2)(1), 3(1).
266
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 63, location not identified (Mar. 8,
2008) (on file with author).
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company had originally issued two series of shares, with the
shares held by the founders carrying ten times the votes of the
other series.267
In addition, the SE’s provisions for employee representation
exposed Eastern European Member States to Finland’s robust
protections on workers’ rights. Elcoteq struggled to negotiate
with representatives from its Baltic subsidiaries whose language
frequently lacked translations for basic collective bargaining
terms.268 The company also had to pause negotiations while some
countries drafted laws establishing a process for selecting
employee representatives.269 The SE legislation required them to
be elected pursuant to national legislation.270
3.

Limits

Although the SE has made reincorporation legal, in the
absence of a U.S.-style internal affairs doctrine,271 companies
derive few rewards from relocating. Consequently, companies
have shown caution in using the form to move. By contrast,
numerous startup companies have registered in the UK to gain
other advantages the jurisdiction offers,272 following the recent
case law of the ECJ.273
Most European business and labor regulations apply based
on where a company operates, not where it incorporates.274 Many
aspects of the securities laws pertain to where shares are
traded,275 and a company pays taxes everywhere it earns
income.276

267

Id.
Id.
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
See supra text accompanying note 100.
272
See infra Figure 3.
273
See generally Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen,
1999 E.C.R. I-01459; Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor
Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-10155; C-208/00, Überseering BV v.
Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. I-9919, ¶ 94.
274
See, e.g., BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND
OPERATION 435–36 (1997).
275
See, e.g., Deakin, supra note 261, at 23. But see Prospectus Directive 2003/71,
2003 O.J. (L 345) 64 (EC).
276
See, e.g., Bouwman & Werbrouk, supra note 194 (“[A]n SE is potentially
subject to the tax laws of [thirty] countries.”); Helminen, supra note 193, at 29
(“Consequently, the introduction of the SE legal form will not eliminate the fact that
268
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The majority of registered SEs do not yet operate.277 These
“shelf companies” (“shelfs”) exist legally but do not conduct
business or employ any workers. Private companies, such as
Foratis AG in Germany, create the empty corporate structures to
sell.278 Their customers can move the shelfs into other Member
States and put them into operation. The pre-made forms,
established according to the laws of a different Member State,
appeal to companies in Member States with complicated rules for
forming SEs. Conducting business through a company that was
once a shelf also saves the buyers time and, in some jurisdictions,
increases access to investment capital and other contracts.279
So far, only four companies have converted a shelf into an
operational company,280 and many commentators cite the large
number of shelfs to dismiss the usefulness of the SE.281 The
proportion of SE companies that conduct business, however,
appears to be growing.282 The remaining shelfs could be moved

each company engaged in cross-border activities in the EU Single Market must
comply with a large number of different national tax regimes.”).
277
See ETUI, Established SEs Fact Sheet Overview, supra note 18.
278
See, e.g., Beiten Burkhardt, Beiten Burkhardt Establishes Its Own European
PLC (2005), http://www.bblaw.com/uploads/media/European_PLC.pdf.
279
See Interview with Anonymous Source No. 27, location not identified (Feb.
25, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 55, location
not identifies (Feb. 28, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous
Source No. 74, location not identified (Apr. 28, 2008) (on file with author).
280
Atrium Erste Europaische VV SE became Convergence CT SE, Atrium
Funfte Europaische VV SE became Donata Holding SE, Pro-Jura 0407 SE became
Orchestra Service SE, see ERNST & YOUNG, SOCIETE D’AVOCATS, STUDY ON THE
OPERATION AND THE IMPACTS OF THE STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY appx. 2
(2009), and Sarpedon 2006/01 Vermogensverwaltungs became Max Boegl
International SE. See generally SEEUROPE, SES IN EUROPE (2008), available at
http://www.worker-participation.eu/content/download/1818/14558/.
281
See, e.g., CTR. FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, CORPORATE TAXATION AND
THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE, CEPS TASK FORCE REPORT 2 (2008); Interview
with Anonymous Source No. 9, location not identified (Dec. 11, 2008) (on file with
author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 15, location not identified (Feb. 7,
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 17, location not
identified (Dec. 13, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 25, location not identified (Feb. 4, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 29, location not identified (Jan, 22, 2008) (on file with
author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 33, location not identified (Feb. 4,
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 43, location not
identified (Jan. 23, 2008) (on file with author).
282
See infra Figure 3.
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and activated at any time, suggesting the potential for future
relocations.283
Figure 3. Operating vs. Non-operating SEs284

Meanwhile, many new companies have established
themselves in the UK in order to access its capital markets and
judicial system. Between 2003 and 2006, more than 67,000
foreign entities registered British private limited companies
(“plcs”). Most came from France, Germany, the Netherlands, and
Norway.285 The low-cost German airline, Air Berlin, for example,
registered as a UK plc, went public, and listed on the German
British plcs avoid employee representation rules,
DAX.286
although workers must continue to serve on the boards of
subsidiaries located in countries that require representation.287

283
It should also be noted that SE Regulation art. 14, para. 1, mandated the
Member States to implement the SE Directive prior to October 8, 2004. On that
date, however, only five member states—Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and
Sweden—had done so. See SE Regulation, supra note 10, art. 14, para. 1.
284
See EUROPEAN TRADE UNION INSTITUTE, supra note 117.
285
Marco Becht, Colin Mayer & Hannes F. Wagner, Where Do Firms
Incorporate? Deregulation and the Cost of Entry 2 (ECGI, Working Paper No.
70/2006, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=906066.
286
See Volker Triebel & Christopher Horton, Will More English PLCs Take Off
in Germany?, INT’L FIN. L. REV., July 2006, at 34, 36.
287
See, e.g., Simon Deakin, Regulatory Competition Versus Harmonization in
European Company Law, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 15, at 190, 205–06; Cheffins,
supra note 274, at 441–42.
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The first-order incorporations in the UK have also prompted
convergence among the laws of the Member States. France,288
Spain,289 Germany,290 and the Netherlands291 have all recently
eliminated or lowered their minimum capital requirements to
match the UK’s more lenient standards.292 The Dutch and
German consultation documents explicitly reference the need to
compete with the UK.293 Germany has also begun to allow new
companies to establish themselves according to the same terms
the UK offers,294 and the Dutch Parliament has launched a
review of its private limited company law.295
4.

U.S. Comparison

In the U.S., although the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution provides for federal authority over matters of
corporate law,296 an informal understanding, the “internal affairs
doctrine,” assigns to state law matters that pertain to the
“internal affairs” of corporations.297 The “internal affairs” include
the relationships among directors, officers, and investors.298
288
See Loi 2003-721 du 1 août 2003 pour l’initiative économique [Law No. 2003721 of August 1, 2003 Economic Initiative], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 5, 2003, p. 13464.
289
See Ulrich Seibert, Close Corporations—Reforming Private Company Law:
European and International Perspectives, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 83, 87 (2007).
290
Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur
Neuregelung des Mindestkapitals der GmbH [MindestkapG] [Draft Bill of the
Government, Draft Law on the Reform of the Minimum Capital of the Limited
Company] (2005) [hereinafter Draft Reform Law], available at http://www.bmj.de/
media/archive/950.pdf.
291
See Hylda Boschma et al., The Reform of Dutch Private Company Law: New
Rules for the Protection of Creditors, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 567, 569 n. 1 (2007);
Final Report of the Expert Group, Simplification of Company (BV) Law, May 6,
2004, available at http://english.ez.nl/english/Subjects/Simplification_of_Company_
BV_Law.htm.
292
See Seibert, supra note 289.
293
See Draft Reform Law, supra note 288.
294
See Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur
Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen [MoMiG] [Limited Liability Company Law and
Abuse of Modernization Struggle Act] May 23, 2007, § A, available at
http://www.bmj.bund.de/files/-/2109/MoMiG-RegE%2023%C2005%2007.pdf; see also
Patrick C. Leyens, German Company Law: Recent Developments and Future
Challenges, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1407, 1412–13 (2005).
295
See supra note 291.
296
See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–18 (2005).
297
Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).
298
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302(2) (1971); see also
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987) (“It thus is an accepted
part of the business landscape in this country for States to create corporations, to
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Each state offers its own system of corporate rules, and
companies may incorporate anywhere, regardless of their
connections to a particular state.
The other states must
recognize companies registered elsewhere; the law of the state of
incorporation governs disputes, no matter where they occur.299
The desirability of the charter market and whether it has
caused a race to the top or to the bottom in corporate law has
long been debated.
Companies pay franchise taxes and
additional fees to states in order to incorporate, which introduces
the potential for state competition to attract their business.300
Over time, however, Delaware has become the state of choice for
the significant majority of incorporated and incorporating
companies. It has built up specialized courts accustomed to
adjudicating complicated corporate matters and a rich store of
precedent case law, which has promoted foreseeable outcomes
and stability in the law. Today, Delaware is home to over fifty
percent of the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange
and almost sixty percent of Fortune 500 companies.301

prescribe their powers, and to define the rights that are acquired by purchasing
their shares.”); Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645 (“The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of
laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to
regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships
among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and
shareholders—because otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting
demands.”); Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the
Internal Affairs Doctrine in Corporation Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 29, 30–32 (1987);
Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 162 (1985); Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From
Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1162 (2000) (“In the
United States, the law of a corporation’s state of incorporation almost always
governs its management and control arrangements.”).
299
See Ribstein, supra note 58, at 825–27.
300
See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 15–
16 (1993); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 548–49 (1990); Heine & Kerber, supra note 9
(“Historically this system had never been designed deliberately, but emerged in the
context of the fight against trusts and monopolies at the end of the nineteenth
century, when the government of New Jersey attempted to give monopolies and
trusts a new home—in exchange for the payment of a tax for using the corporate
law. So, the incentive of the states to engage in charter competition is the raising of
the ‘franchise tax.’ ” (citations omitted)); Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Law and
Corporate Governance: A Contractual Perspective, 18 J. CORP. L. 185, 195 (1993).
301
See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition
for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2000).
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Theorists who believe the convergence on Delaware
represents the conclusion of a race to the bottom argue that
regulatory competition among the states has caused Delaware to
adopt pro-management rules, to the detriment of shareholder
rights. Others see a race to the top in corporate law and credit
market forces with promoting innovation and experimentation,
which have led to efficiency gains.302
Reincorporating in Delaware has costs. Delaware charges
higher franchise taxes than other states, and companies that do
not actually conduct business there must pay additional fees to
the states in which they operate.303 A relocating company must
pay filing charges and hold a shareholder meeting for approval of
the move.304 Privately-held companies reincorporate by merging
Any
with a shell corporation registered in Delaware.305
shareholder who votes against the merger can exercise appraisal
rights and receive the full cash value of his shares. 306
The preeminence of Delaware also remains subject to the
threat of federal preemption and other mechanisms of federal
control.307 Although the U.S. has no federal statute for corporate
law,308 from the Securities Act of 1933309 to the Sarbanes-Oxley
302
Early proponents of these opposing views were William Cary and Ralph
Winter. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1–40 (1991); William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974);
Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection,
and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). Others have made
efficiency arguments against charter competition. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuck,
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1442–43 (1992). Some have emphasized the
interest groups involved in the competition. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey
P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 469, 469–70 (1987).
303
See ROMANO, supra note 300, at 34.
304
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251 (West 2010); ROMANO, supra note 300, at 34.
305
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 252; ROMANO, supra note 300, at 34.
306
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262; see, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 300, at 34.
307
See Roe, supra note 22, at 598–99; see also Landau, supra note 9, at 32–33.
308
This is not for lack of trying. At the Constitutional Convention, James
Madison proposed a scheme for federal incorporation, JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 638 (1966), and President
Theodore Roosevelt also called for federal regulation of corporations. THEODORE
ROOSEVELT, First Annual Message, in THE WORKS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 15, 81,
92 (Herman Hagedorn ed., 1926). A Federal Bureau of Corporations existed between
1890 and 1912. See generally Melvin I. Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation in
the Progressive Era, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 160 (1982) (discussing the history of
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Act of 2002,310 federal legislation has long competed with
Delaware and displaced its less optimal rules. When the federal
government has intervened, it has generally done so as a
monopoly legislator and entirely preempted the states.311 Thus,
corporate law in the U.S. has alternated between two extreme
poles: It has either been entrusted to unfettered inter-state
competition or has been relinquished to a central, monopolistic
actor.312
The SE, however, appears unlikely to contribute
substantially to the creation of a “European Delaware.” Unlike
in the U.S., SE companies must demonstrate a connection to the
Member State in which they incorporate and pay other fees,
without gaining many advantages in return.
C.

Threatening Social Europe?

Because the SE legislation did not preempt national laws,
companies may convert to the form in order to substitute its
rules for national requirements. As SEs, they can select between
a one-tier or two-tier board313 and renegotiate employee
representation,314 raising concerns that they will adopt the form
to arbitrage around national standards for workers’ rights.315 In
fact, while some European companies have adopted one-tier
board structures, and others have used the SE to decrease the
federal incorporation law). The Depression brought renewed calls for a federal
corporations law. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and SEC Chairman William O.
Douglas attempted unsuccessfully to persuade Congress to pass a law instituting
federal incorporation during Roosevelt’s second term. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 205 (3d ed. 2003). Congress,
instead, introduced the Federal Securities Acts. Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A.
Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56
VAND. L. REV. 859, 860–62 (2003). It should also be noted that Erie Railrod Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80–81 (1938), overturned Justice Story’s Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. 1 (1842), holding that federal courts could apply rules of general commercial
law.
309
Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa
(2006)).
310
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28, and 29 U.S.C.).
311
See, e.g., Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280–81 (1987).
312
See Legal Diversity, supra note 19, at 14–15.
313
SE Regulation, supra note 10, art. 38.
314
See Council Directive 2001/86/EC, § II, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 24–27; Leca, supra
note 92, at 417; Teichmann, supra note 103, at 1333.
315
See supra note 21.
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size of their supervisory boards and appoint foreign works to
them, the costs have been high and labor unions are adapting.
The interview data suggest that the SE will contribute to an
eventual equilibrium of smaller, more international supervisory
boards and more regionalized labor strategies. Even though
companies are using the SE to relax employee representation,
those accustomed to codetermination appear committed to the
stakeholder model, in which companies serve the interests of
employees and other groups,316 rather than focusing solely on the
maximization of shareholder wealth.317
Executive and nonexecutive directors serve together on onetier boards, which have responsibility for making and executing
corporate decisions. Two-tier boards contain a management
board, made up of executive directors who run the company
directly, and a supervisory board of nonexecutives, who oversee
the management board through the appointment, supervision,
and removal of its members.
Employee representation developed from the efforts of
European trade unions to secure a direct say for their members
in the affairs of the companies for which they worked. Many
Member States specify a level of employee representation
required on the boards of different types of companies of different
sizes.318 In Austria, for example, all joint stock companies and
any limited liability company with more than three hundred
employees must appoint employee representatives to one third of
the seats on the supervisory board.319 In Hungary, any company
with more than two-hundred employees must appoint employee
representatives to one-third of the seats on the supervisory
316
See, e.g., Friedrich Kübler, A Shifting Paradigm of European Company Law?,
11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 219, 219–20 (2005) (discussing the stakeholder philosophy).
317
See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.
The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.”); Mark J. Roe, The
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 2063, 2065 (2001) (“Shareholder wealth maximization is usually accepted as
the appropriate goal in American business circles.”). But see Revlon Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180, 185 (Del. 1986) (deferring
to the business judgment of directors and seemingly requiring shareholder interests
to be primary only in cases of a sale of control).
318
Codetermination does not exist under Belgian, British, Bulgarian, Cypriot,
Estonian, Italian, Latvian, or Lithuanian law.
319
See Österreichischer Corporate Governance Kodex (Austrian Code of
Corporate Governance) art. 59 (2009), translated at http://www.wienerborse.at/
corporate/pdf/CG_Code_engl_2009draft_tr_fin.pdf.
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board.320
Germany has the most rigorous requirements:
employees occupy one-half of the supervisory board seats in large
German companies.321
1.

Limited Benefits from One-Tier Option

The choice of a one-tier board structure has not been
significant for most companies. Every participant in the study
emphasized that large companies with employee representation
would not adopt the SE in order to select a one-tier board: A
unitary board would place employee representatives alongside
management, eliminating the barrier restricting them to a
supervisory function. In addition, the national laws of most
Member States that require dual boards do not delineate how a
one-tier board with employee representatives would operate,
although Germany has explicitly legislated codetermination in
one-tier SE companies.322 As a result, only smaller SE companies
without employee representation have chosen a one-tier
structure.323 They have done so to streamline their operations
and to increase the power of their executive directors, aligning
themselves more closely with companies from Member States
without employee representation systems.
Case 9: Plansee (Austria)
Plansee, the closely-held Austrian metalworks company,
used the SE to replace its two-tier board with a one-tier board,
even though it had to increase the number of outside
representatives on the board to do so.324 Plansee is part of a
320
See Norbert Kluge, Europeanisation and Organised Labor: An Unsolved
Dilemma 10 (Warwick Univ., Nov. 18–19, 2005), available at http://www.
docstoc.com/docs/70565273/European-Company-Representation-Agreement.
321
See Gesetz uber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeignehmer [Codetermination Act
of 1976], May 4, 1976, BGBl. I at 1153, §§ 1, 7 (Ger.); Jan von Hein, Between a Rock
and a Hard Place—German Codetermination Under Pressure, KYOTO J.L. & POL.
May 2007, at 1, 2.
322
The German Ministry of Economics and Labour has legislated
codetermination in one-tier SE companies. See Gesetz der Implementierung der
Regelung [SE-Ausführungsgesetz] [SEAG] [SE Implementation Act] § 6, Dec. 22,
2004, BGBl I at 3675, available at http://bundesrecht.juris.de.
323
For example, Mensch und Maschine Software, a German SE with 350
employees and Sevic Systems, another Germany company with approximately 100
employees. See ETUI, Established SEs Fact Sheet Overview, supra note 18 (select
companies from the index).
324
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 53, company lawyers and officers,
location not indentified (Mar. 19, 2008) (on file with author).
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group of related companies; the other two are based in
Luxembourg and have one-tier structures.325 Their managing
directors previously served on the Supervisory Board of Plansee
and could therefore control Plansee’s managing director.326 With
the new, one-tier SE, all of the managing directors sit on the
same level in all three companies.327 Plansee’s lawyers and
officers say that the new organization appears more
understandable to potential foreign investors and venture
partners.328
Case 10: PCC (Germany)
PCC, the closely-held German energy company, also used the
SE to establish a one-tier board. The new structure has enabled
the owner, who chairs the board, to strengthen his control of the
company. Before the conversion, a supervisory board of three
outside directors ratified his decisions.329 The integrated board
now has only one external member, a former representative to
the supervisory board, who serves alongside the company’s
owner, and a former member of the Management Board.330 The
owner can more easily pass initiatives he proposes under the new
arrangement.331
Many companies describe the European branding that the
SE offers as an additional benefit of conversion.332 PCC conducts
extensive operations in Poland and has failed to complete two
attempted takeovers of Polish chemical companies.333
The
company blames the failures on a perception in Poland that
325
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 59, company lawyers and officers,
location not indentified (Mar. 10, 2008) (on file with author).
326
Id.
327
Id.
328
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 53; Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 59.
329
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 55, location not identified (Feb. 28,
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 58, location not
identified (Apr. 28, 2008) (on file with author).
330
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 55; Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 58.
331
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 55; Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 58.
332
See, e.g., Mathias M. Siems, The Impact of the European Company (SE) on
Legal Culture, 30 EUR. L. REV. 431, 435 (2005). For a theoretical analysis of what it
means to give legal expression to identity, see Hans Lindahl, European Integration:
Popular Sovereignty and a Politics of Boundaries, 6 EUR. L.J. 239, 240–44 (2000).
333
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 55.
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German corporate ownership threatens Polish employment.334 It
has eagerly embraced the European status that the SE confers.335
2.

Survivability of Stakeholder Models

While all German companies with employee representation
have retained their two-tier boards after converting to the SE,336
many of them have changed the size and composition of their
supervisory boards.337 The SE Directive sets out a process for
negotiating an agreement with workers that holds the potential
to ease the demands of codetermination, even though the overall
proportion of employee representation must remain the same.338
The process, however, has proven both costly and difficult, and
the companies that have undertaken it have not eliminated
codetermination entirely, as they could have by reincorporating
in a Member State that does not require it.339 Instead, the
334

Id.
Id.
336
For example, Allianz, BASF, Carthago Value Invest, Fresenius, Hager, Man
Diesel, Max Boegl International, Porsche Holding, and Surteco. See ETUI,
Established SEs Fact Sheet Overview, supra note 18 (select companies from the
index).
337
Using the political system to reduce the burden of German codetermination
has not been possible. See, e.g., Angel R. Oquendo, Breaking on Through to the Other
Side: Understanding Continental European Corporate Governance, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 975, 994 (2001). Since its enactment in 1952, the German Codetermination
Act has been revised only once in 1976. According to Oquendo,
[D]uring the debate that led to the enactment of the 1998 Corporate
Control and Transparency Act, the acting Minister of Justice, businessmen,
and legal experts unanimously supported reducing the size of the
supervisory council. Nonetheless, unions and the Minister of Labor opposed
this position. They eventually carried the day and blocked the reform.
Id.
338
SE Directive, supra note 10, § 2, art. 3(4).
339
See Hanns-William Mülsch & Sven Piegsa, Excursus: Societas Europaea
(“S.E.”), in EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW 371, 372 (Karel Van Hulle & Harald Gesell
eds., 2006). For Friedrich Kübler’s description of the process of using the SE to
eliminate codetermination entirely, see Kübler, supra note 316, at 232–33.
If we assume that a German stock corporation with more than 2000
employees, Widget AG (“Widget”), wants to get rid of the German regime of
worker participation on the supervisory board, it can merge with a British
public limited company by forming a European Company, Widget SE, to be
registered in the UK. The British partner in the merger could be small and
unimportant; it could be a wholly owned subsidiary of Widget. This move
will not free Widget from codetermination; it will have to negotiate with its
employees and their union the agreement provided for in the Directive. . . .
But two years after the date of the registration Widget can make a next
move: now the firm is able to transform the (British) SE into a British plc.
UK law does not impose any form of employee participation on companies.
335
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companies in the study described codetermination as an
important instrument of legitimacy for making decisions that
adversely affect their employees.340 While more concentrated
governance makes it faster for companies to make choices and
implement them, codetermination facilitates consensus and
defuses conflict.341 Labor unions have also begun to refocus their
strategies in response to changes in the character of employee
representation on boards.
German codetermination rules include two important
thresholds: companies with more than 500 employees but less
than 2,000 must offer one third of their supervisory board seats
to employee representatives;342 companies with more than 2,000
employees must offer one half of the positions.343 In the latter
case, not only employee codetermination but also the size of the
supervisory board is fixed by mandatory law.344 As a result,
German companies with fewer than 2,000 employees have
converted to the SE in order to hold the proportion of employee
Neither the SE-Regulation nor the SE-Directive require the preservation of
codetermination in such a case.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
340
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 2, location not identified (Dec. 5, 2007)
(on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 4, location not identified
(Dec. 10, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 10,
location not identified (Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 17, location not identified (Dec. 13, 2007) (on file with
author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 21, location not identified (Jan. 21,
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 25, location not
identified (Feb. 4, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No.
26, location not identified (Feb. 23, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 27, location not identified (Feb. 5, 2008) (on file with author);
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 29, location not identified (Jan. 22, 2008) (on
file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 30, location not identified
(Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 38,
location not identified (Jan. 30, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 42, location not identified (Mar. 18, 2008) (on file with
author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 45, location not identified (Feb. 15,
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 74, location not
identified (Apr. 28, 2008) (on file with author).
341
See, e.g., Teichmann, supra note 103, at 1333.
342
Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz [One-Third Employee Representation Act], May 18,
2004, BGBl. I at 974, last amended by Gesetz, July 30, 2009, BGBl. I. at 2479, § 1
(Ger.).
343
Gesetz uber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeignehmer [Codetermination Act of
1976], May 4, 1976, BGBl. I at 1153 (Ger.).
344
Id. II, § 7 (12 members in companies with a workforce not exceeding 10,000
employees, 16 members in companies with a workforce not exceeding 20,000
employees, 20 members in companies with a workforce exceeding 20,000 employees).
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representation to the lower level. Those with more than 2,000
employees have used the SE to renegotiate the size of their
supervisory boards, even though they have not been able to
change the percentage of representation on the boards.345
Case 11: Fresenius (Germany)
Fresenius, the German healthcare company with a staff of
1,000 in one hundred countries, converted to the SE in order to
freeze the size of its supervisory board prior to reaching the 2,000
employee threshold.346 The company expected to acquire a
hospital business with many additional employees.347 Without
the SE, it would have had to increase its supervisory board to
twenty people from twelve.348
Case 12: Allianz (Germany)
With a workforce of more than 181,000, German
codetermination rules mandate Allianz to provide half of its
supervisory board seats to employees, but the SE allowed
the company some changes. The company followed the process
set out in the SE directive. It created a Special Negotiating Body
of European employees349 to conduct negotiations with
management. The negotiations concluded with a reduction in the
size of the supervisory board from twenty to twelve, albeit with
the same fifty percent ratio of employees that German law
requires.350 Whereas previously the employee representatives all

345
See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Pathways to Corporate Convergence? Two Steps
on the Road to Shareholder Capitalism in Germany, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 219, 222
(1999) (“Supervisory boards are unwieldy—commonly twenty seats.”); Mark J. Roe,
German Codetermination and German Securities Markets, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 199,
200 (1999) (“[I]nformation flow to the board is poor, and the board is often too big
and unwieldy to be effective.”).
346
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 29, location not identified (Jan. 22,
2008) (on file with author).
347
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 31, location not identified (Feb. 22,
2008) (on file with author).
348
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 29; Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 31; Interview with Anonymous Source No. 74, location not identified (Apr. 28,
2008) (on file with author).
349
See Agreement Concerning the Participation of Employees in Allianz SE,
Sept. 21, 2006, available at http://www.allianz.com/en/investor_relations/
transactions/allianz_se/index1.html.
350
Statutes of Allianz SE, Nov. 2007, § 6.1.
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came from Germany, the new supervisory board includes a
French and a British employee.351
Companies with and without codetermination emphasized in
interviews that smaller supervisory boards are easier to
coordinate; fewer people can make decisions more quickly.
Smaller numbers also improve confidentiality and save money
that companies spend on board salaries.
The cost of converting to the SE in order to make changes
can be substantial, however, and some German companies have
chosen simply to keep their original supervisory boards in place
rather than enter the negotiations.352 Allianz paid a total of €95
million to transform into an SE.353 The negotiation process can
also pose challenges.354 BASF, the German chemical company,
spent three months simply to nominate and elect thirty-two
representatives to the Special Negotiating Body from the
different countries in which it operates.355 All of the German
companies that have converted to the SE have negotiated their
representation for the entire six-month period that the directive
allows. For some companies, the “before and after”356 fallback
principle has blocked any adjustments, despite what they have
paid to initiate the process.357
Legal uncertainties regarding what companies can negotiate
also persist. Allianz, as well as BASF, has asserted that a
company’s articles of association determine the size of its
supervisory board.358 Other legal commentators, however, have
suggested that the size of the supervisory board can itself be
351
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 21, location not identified (Jan. 21,
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 29; Interview
with Anonymous Source No. 74.
352
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 28, location not identified (Feb. 21,
2008) (on file with author).
353
Statutes of Allianz SE, Nov. 2007, § 18.1.
354
See, e.g., Christoph Teichmann, Restructuring Companies in Europe: A
German Perspective, 15 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1325, 1335 (2004) (“To be sure, the
negotiation procedure of the directive is burdensome and time consuming. Given the
time pressure usually involved in international mergers and acquisitions, the
negotiation period of six months provided for by the directive may fatally affect the
dynamics of such transactions.”).
355
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 29.
356
SE Directive, supra note 10, recital 18.
357
SE Regulation, supra note 10, recital 18.
358
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 21; Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 29; Interview with Anonymous Source No. 42, location not identified (Mar. 18,
2008) (on file with author).

WF_Kirshner(with Figures).doc (Do Not Delete)4/13/11 5:23 PM

2010]

“AN EVER CLOSER UNION”

1335

established through the negotiation process with the Special
Negotiating Body. The legislation does not resolve the question
clearly.359
Labor unions are observing the developments closely. The
reduction in the size of Allianz’s supervisory board to twelve and
the internationalization of its members tracks the experience of
other large German companies that have made the transition to
the SE.360 Some fear the form will weaken labor strength
because employees from different Member States have conflicting
interests and no common history of acting together.361 Others
argue that internationalization enhances the legitimacy of
employee representation because it reflects the actual
composition of modern workforces.362
According to the European Trade Union Institute for
Research, Education, and Health and Safety (“ETUI”), the SE is
forcing the creation of a more regional arrangement for union
activities.363 The European Trade Union Confederation (“ETUC”)
359
Hartmut Oetker, Unternehmensmitbestimmung in der SE Kraft
Vereinbarung, 27 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (ZIP) 1113 (2006); Interview
with Anonymous Source No. 29.
360
Man Diesel SE, for example, also reduced its Supervisory Board from twenty
to ten and internationalized its employee representatives. See MAN Diesel,
http://www.manbw.com/category_000449.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
361
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 4, location not identified (Dec. 10,
2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 5, location not
identified (Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 9, location not identified (Dec. 11, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 12, location not identified (Dec. 11, 2008) (on file with
author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 26, location not identified (Feb. 23,
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 35, location not
identified (Feb. 5, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No.
38, location not identified (Jan. 30, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 41, location not identified (Feb. 7, 2008) (on file with author).
362
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 10, location not identified (Dec. 7,
2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 14, location not
identified (Jan. 28, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 17, location not identified (Dec. 13, 2007) (on file with author); Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 21, location not identified (Jan. 21, 2008) (on file with
author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 27, location not identified (Feb. 5,
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 31, location not
identified (Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 37, location not identified (Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with author).
363
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 74, location not identified (Apr. 28,
2008) (on file with author); see also EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON INTEGRATION AND HARMONIZATION 48 (Richard M.
Buxbaum et al. eds., 1991) (discussing the “national organizing vision” of American
labor unions and the likelihood that “the emergence of vigorous competition across
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has begun to intermediate in negotiations.
It provides
translators to help workers act collectively.364 It also hopes to
broaden the workers’ goals, as multinational companies pay
decreasing attention to national unions who refer to national
rights under national law and pit national unions against each
other.365
The debate that the SE has prompted has also introduced
new discussions about workers’ rights in countries with few
protections of them. Unionization among Member States varies
widely. The union density rate in Norway is nearly eighty
percent, while in France it is only ten percent.366 Collective
bargaining coverage in Slovenia is nearly complete, while in
Lithuania it is only ten percent.367 Every country in which an SE
operates, however, must provide representatives to the Special
Negotiating Body,368 spreading awareness of bargaining power to
countries that have not allowed it. Sample Life Insurance Baltic
SE, for example, trained candidates to the Special Negotiating
Body from its Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian subsidiaries,
where workers had not undertaken similar roles before.369
In contrast to the Baltic States, Scandinavia has a strong
tradition of union representation. More than eighty percent of
the Swedish population belongs to a union, and Swedish

national borders within the European Community will turn the attention of
European labor leaders to the Community level”).
364
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 38; Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 41.
365
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 26; Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 38; Interview with Anonymous Source No. 41; Interview with Anonymous
Source No. 74, location not identified (Apr. 28, 2008) (on file with author).
366
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 38; Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 41.
367
THE EUROPEAN COMPANY—PROSPECTS FOR WORKER BOARD-LEVEL
PARTICIPATION IN THE ENLARGED EU 64–65 (Norbert Kluge & Michael Stollt eds.,
2006).
368
SE Directive, supra note 10, art. 3(2)(a)–(b).
369
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 6, location not identified (Dec. 6, 2007)
(on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 7, location not identified
(Feb. 1, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 26;
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 38; Interview with Anonymous Source No.
41; Interview with Anonymous Source No. 43, location not identified (Jan. 23, 2008)
(on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 56, location not
identified (Mar. 3, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No.
57, location not identified (Apr. 28, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with
Anonymous Source No. 63, location not identified (Mar. 7, 2008) (on file with
author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 74.
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companies with more than twenty-five employees must appoint
workers to their boards.370 In beginning the conversion process to
the SE, Nordea and its principal union, the Confederation of the
Nordic Bank, Finance and Insurance Unions (“NFU”), worked
together closely to strengthen union organization at its
subsidiaries.371 Only its Polish subsidiary had a trade union.372
The NFU received a grant from the European Union to conduct a
series of meetings at the subsidiaries, and Nordea’s directors
participated.373 According to the directors, developing reliable
employee contacts would benefit the company.374
3.

U.S. Comparison

While the Supervisory Board structure does not exist in the
U.S., national corporate governance debates have recently
focused on the importance of outside monitors on company
boards.375 Following Enron and other corporate scandals,376 in
the Fall of 2003, the SEC approved new rules mandating
publicly-listed companies to fill the majority of their board seats

370
THE EUROPEAN COMPANY—PROSPECTS FOR WORKER BOARD-LEVEL
PARTICIPATION IN THE ENLARGED EU, supra note 368; id. at 83–85.
371
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 7.
372
Id.; Interview with Anonymous Source No. 8, location not identified (Feb. 1,
2008) (on file with author).
373
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 7; Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 8.
374
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 7; Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 8. See generally Nordea Annual Report 2006, at 7, available at
http://www.finansforbundet.dk/images/unioninnordea/Generelt/union%20nordea%20
annual%20report%20endelig.pdf; Ammattiliitto Suora, EU Promotes Employee
Influence in the European Company Nordea SE (Nov. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.suora.fi/Resource.phx/sivut/uutiset/u2004/eupromote.htx (discussing the
Nordea SE Project).
375
Cf. American Law Institute, Functions and Powers of the Board of Directors,
in PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 3.02, at 86–87 (1994). See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent
Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market
Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468 (2007) (discussing the historical developments of
independent directors in the United States).
376
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the
Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. L. 1403, 1403 (2002); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance
Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35
CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2003); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the
Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial
Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2002); Paul M. Healy & Krishna G.
Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (2003); Deborah L. Rhode & Paul
D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 9, 9 (2002).
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with independent directors.377 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002378
also requires independent directors to serve on the audit
committees of company boards.379
The rules reflect the
assumption that outsiders oversee management more closely
than insiders do and also act in the best interests of shareholders
when they review corporate decisions. Several empirical studies,
however, have indicated that their appointment actually offers
few benefits to shareholders, as measured by firm performance
and stock price.380 Independent directors served in the majority
of board positions at Enron.381
Employee ownership has also become increasingly common.
In 2006, twenty million Americans held shares in their workplace
through a 401(k) plan, employee stock option plan, or direct stock
grant, and roughly eleven million held stock options.382 Nearly
thirty-five percent of employees of companies that issued stock
owned its shares.383
Unionization and attitudes towards unionization tend to be
uniform in the U.S., although the western states have recently
experienced higher growth in unionization384 than the rest of the
country.385 Most labor unions belong to national umbrella

377
Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, Exchange Act Release No. 3448745, 81 SEC Docket 1586 (Nov. 4, 2003).
378
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11,
15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SOX].
379
Id. § 301, 116 Stat. at 775–77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j–l(m)
(2006)).
380
See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between
Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 942 (1999) (“Most
studies find little correlation, but a number of recent studies report evidence of a
negative correlation between the proportion of independent directors and firm
performance—the exact opposite of conventional wisdom.”).
381
See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the
New Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley 3 (Harvard Law Sch., Ctr. for Law, Econ.,
and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 416, 2003).
382
National Center for Employee Ownership, Data Show Widespread Employee
Ownership in U.S. (Mar. 2, 2007), http://www.nceo.org/library/widespread.html.
383
See id. (stating the results of the 2006 General Social Survey).
384
See AFL-CIO, Facts and Statistics: United States, Union Membership,
available at http://www.aflcio.org/issues/factsstats/factsstats.cfm (last visited Oct.
10, 2010). The percentage of workers belonging to a union increased by 2.3% in
Washington state and by 1.2% in California between 2000 and 2007. Id. In
Tennessee and Illinois, it decreased by 3.8% each, within the same time period. Id.
385
Unionization overall, however, has fallen considerably. According to the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, unionization dropped from 32% of the private sector in
1956 to 7.8% in 2005. United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
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organizations: the American Federation of Labor-Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) or the Change to Win
Federation, which separated from the AFL-CIO in 2005.386 The
National Labor Relations Board, a federal agency, oversees the
administration of the National Labor Relations Act, which has
regulated unions operating in the private sector387 since 1935.388
An array of federal389 and state law390 governs public-sector
unions;391 state labor boards primarily oversee their operations.392
The SE has contributed to the reorganization, but retained
the presence, of employee representatives on company boards in
Member States with codetermination systems and has also
influenced the level at which labor unions direct their efforts.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the U.S. and for Europe, the question of how to integrate
economic markets at the regional level while retaining respect for
local autonomy is critical, but each has chosen to navigate the

Statistics:
Union
Membership
by
Industry,
2005,
avaliable
at
www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2006/jan/wk4/art02.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
386
The Service Employees International Union, the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, the United Food and Commercial Workers, and the United Farm
Workers of America comprise Change to Win. Change to Win, About Us,
http://www.changetowin.org/about-us.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
387
Section 152 excludes “the United States or any wholly owned Government
corporation.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006). The Civil Service Reform Act,
5 U.S.C. §§ 7101–35 (2006), enacted in 1978, provides federal public employees the
right to collective bargaining.
388
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74–198, 49 Stat.
449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69).
389
Title 29 of the C.F.R. enforces Federal labor laws. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1.1
(2010). The Department of Labor enforces more than 180 employment and labor
laws. The Office of Labor-Management Standards of the U.S. Department of Labor
enforces the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. See
29 U.S.C. § 435; 29 C.F.R. § 70.53. The Civil Service Reform Act and its
implementing regulations cover unions representing federal employees. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 7101.
390
Wisconsin became the first state to pass a statute protecting the rights of
public employees to engage in collective bargaining in 1959. See JOSEPH E. SLATER,
PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE STATE,
1900–1962, at 158 (2004).
391
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.080 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-271
(West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 2 (West 2004); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4117.03 (West 2010).
392
See, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/1 to /27 (West 2010); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4117.02 (West 2010) (requiring a three-member labor board); N.Y. CIV. SERV.
LAW §§ 200–14 (McKinney 2010).
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tensions arising from multi-level governance in different ways.
Companies clamor for a single set of rules to follow, as early
support in the U.S. for mutual recognition of companies by the
states and the demand for first-order incorporations in the UK by
European companies has demonstrated. Several companies in
the study called for a global corporate form, even more ambitious
than the SE’s protracted attempt to create a unified body of
European corporate law.393
Because the competition between the states over corporate
law has largely been won by Delaware, the U.S. experience
reflects the imposition of rules pre-chosen by a single legislator,
either Delaware or the federal government.394 When the federal
government has intervened in matters of corporate regulation, it
has done so completely,395 using the doctrine of preemption396 to
393
Interview with Anonymous Source No. 16, location not identified (Dec. 12,
2007) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source No. 29, location not
identified (Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Anonymous Source
No. 70, location not identified (Mar. 17, 2008) (on file with author); see also A. Claire
Cutler, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2003); Filip De Ly, Lex Mercatoria (New Law Merchant):
Globalisation and International Self-Regulation, in RULES AND NETWORKS: THE
LEGAL CULTURE OF GLOBAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 159 (Richard P. Appelbaum et
al. eds., 2001); Jean-Phillippe Robé, Multinational Enterprises: The Constitution of a
Pluralistic Legal Order, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 45, 68–71 (G. Teubner
ed., 1997) (discussing globalization of business and aspirations to keep it form
national regulatory restraints). But see Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther
Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation
of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004).
394
See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political
Morality of Federal Systems, 90 VA. L. REV. 731, 820 (2004) (“[T]he dominant
tendency in U.S. jurisprudence has been to view the projects of federal and state
governance as essentially distinct and to solve intergovernmental conflicts by trying
to establish clear boundaries between the two.”); Robert A. Schapiro & William W.
Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause
Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1236–52 (2003).
395
For calls for a less “dualistic” approach to U.S. federalism and suggesting
new models such as “dynamic federalism,” “interactive federalism,” and “cooperative
federalism,” see, for example, Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative Federalism, in
COMPETITION AMONG STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 80–83 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to
Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2004); Renee Jones, Does Federalism Matter?:
Its Perplexing Role in the Corporate Governance Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
879 (2006); Schapiro, supra note 2.
396
The federal preemption doctrine disallows state laws that are inconsistent
with federal legislation or which impinge on areas in which Congress has already
“occupied the field” with legislation. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Reviving
Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90
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exclude the states from the field.397 Democratic processes and
direct representation support a powerful federal Congress, and
the political consensus it embodies offers it the possibility to
implement swift, radical change.398 In the absence of any
competitor to the federal government, however, robust federal
legislation threatens to succumb to rent-seeking or over-reaction.
Many commentators, for example, view the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
as the misguided result of a rush by Congress to respond to
public anxiety.399 They advocate a more measured process of
experimentation and learning, in order to strike a more efficient
balance between the deterrence of corporate fraud and the cost of
corporate compliance.
Reflecting its history and also by virtue of political necessity,
the EU has had to preserve far more diversity in national laws
from the outset of its regional regulatory initiatives. It has been
faced with the escalating demands of businesses for measures
easing their operations across European borders, as well as
recent decisions by the European Court of Justice. As a result,
the EU has begun to chart a new relationship between an upperlevel regulatory authority and those of the individual Member
States different from the U.S. federalist arrangement.400 Lacking

CAL. L. REV. 485, 526 n.203 (2002) (discussing the Supreme Court’s “promiscuous
use” of preemption); Alison Cassady, Tying the Hands of States: The Impact of
Federal Preemption on State Problem-Solvers, at 2 (National Association of State
PIRGS, July 2004) (“[F]ederal preemption has often tied the hands of state
legislators and regulators eager to solve problems facing their constituents”). Under
Business Roundtable v. SEC, however, federal regulatory agencies may not
unilaterally preempt state law; they require clear congressional authorization to do
so. 905 F.2d 406, 412, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
397
Where state and federal spheres of regulation coexist, such as proxy
regulation, they hew self-consciously to a dualistic notion of federalism, in which the
federal securities laws may govern disclosure and procedure but may not intrude
into state law areas of corporate governance.
398
Compare Dieter Grimm, Does Europe Need a Constitution?, 1 EUR. L.J. 282,
291 (1995) (“The European public power is not one that derives from the people, but
one mediated through States. Since the Treaties thus have not an internal but an
external reference point, they are also not the expression of a society’s selfdetermination as to the form and objectives of its political unity.”), with PHILIPPE C.
SCHMITTER, HOW TO DEMOCRATIZE THE EUROPEAN UNION . . . AND WHY BOTHER?
(2000).
399
See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1528, 1543–44 (2005).
400
See, e.g., Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at
First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 515, 516 (2001) (“[T]he long-range tendency has been
toward more integration in a complex pattern of shared governance . . . .”).

WF_Kirshner(with Figures).doc (Do Not Delete)4/13/11 5:23 PM

1342

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1273

a founding integrative myth similar to the U.S.,401 and reflecting
its nature as a composite union of mature nations, its approach
has been more indirect and subtle402: The history of the EU has
been marked by covert attempts to offer incremental possibilities
for economic integration, with minimal interference in the legal
systems of its Member States.403 The legislative methodology of
the SE parallels the genesis of the EU and the long-standing
debates over the powers it should carry over local jurisdictions.
The SE has tested the ability of the European Member
States to pool their authority over corporate law. After decades
of negotiation, the EU reached a compromise that, instead of
expropriating the Member States, maintains divergences in their
legal systems by creating a simple framework with minimal
European law. In this way, it secured from Member States their
support for the SE both with and without codetermination
systems, an area in which true consensus was unlikely ever to
emerge. In the five years since the agreement, a growing number
of companies from a variety of industries have navigated
substantial legal uncertainties and expended significant
investments to convert to the new form. Most companies have
done so to streamline their operations and to generate regulatory
efficiencies through centralized branch structures. A few have
used it to gain flexibility for headquarters relocation, or for
organization of their boards of directors.
The remaining diversity in the laws and regulatory
techniques of the Member States has facilitated a process in
which companies can express their preferences for particular
systems and can bring about convergence without the need for ex
401
See EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON
INTEGRATION AND HARMONIZATION 16 (Richard M. Buxbaum et al. eds., 1991)
(stating that European Commission members “do not arrive in office with any
manifesto or programme other than what is in the EEC Treaty”).
402
See, e.g., Juliet Lodge, Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy, 32 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 343, 344 (1994); Eric Stein, Democracy Beyond Nation-State:
On World Trade Organization and European Union 10 (University of Georgia School
of Law Occassional Paper Series, 2002), available at http://digitalcommons.
law.uga.edu/rusk_oc/2 (“Georg Ress calls the [European] Council the Kremlin of the
West.”). See also generally OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
(Veerle Deckmyn & Ian Thomson eds., 1998).
403
See, e.g., Christian Joerges, ‘Deliberative Supranationalism’—Two Defences, 8
EUR. L.J. 133, 149–50 (2002) (discussing the “legitimacy of transnational governance
which can neither be derived from national constitutional law nor from a
supranational order of superior validity,” becoming, therefore, “the core and
enduring problem of European law”).
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ante choices by a centralized regulator. The EU unveiled the SE
in the absence of true European corporate law or corporate
tribunals. While use of the form has been selective, and it has
captured the interest only of selected companies, it has become a
pilot project for what European corporate law could represent
and pointed to the sectors and Member States that are most
likely to want it.
This discovery model, termed “reflexive harmonization,”404
provides a useful building block for U.S. cross-border regulatory
efforts, in areas where international agreement is impossible.405
Pressure to transcend national boundaries and address emerging
transatlantic challenges has intensified in the U.S.406 The
current crisis in the credit markets underscores the need for
404

See supra note 19.
See, e.g., REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 15, at xviii.
The United States and the European Union increasingly collaborate on a
range of regulatory issues in an effort to remove non-tariff barriers and
thus to facilitate trade. For instance, bilateral regulatory harmonization
and mutual recognition efforts have been undertaken by the United States
and the European Union in the context of the New Transatlantic Agenda.
The two blocks have agreed to consult each other in the early stages of
drafting regulations and to rely to a greater extent on each other’s technical
resources and expertise. Recent global mergers such as Boeing/McDonnell
Douglas, WorldCom/MCI, and Daimler/Chrysler have also illustrated the
growing level of cooperation between the US Department of Justice and the
European Commission on antitrust matters.
Id. at 41 (internal citations omitted); see also EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON INTEGRATION AND HARMONIZATION 399 (Richard M.
Buxbaum et al. eds., 1991) (“More frequent will be the determination—especially in
bank and capital market law—that a global solution would be even better than a
European one . . . . [I]n this case the clear choice would be a regional
solution . . . coupled so far as possible with . . . multilateral regulation . . . .”). But see
Stephan, supra note 29, at 788.
The project of unifying substantive international commercial law . . . . has
its own political economy with predictable and unattractive implications for
what it produces. International unification instruments display a strong
tendency either to compromise legal certainty or to advance the agendas of
interest groups. In either case they offer no obvious gains as compared to
rules produced through the national legislative process.
Id.
406
See, e.g., REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 15, at x (“[T]he push toward open markets
and higher degrees of international economic interdependence seems inexorable”).
On the internationalization of securities markets and the resulting legal
interdependence, see, for example, Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real:
International Securities Regulation in a World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38
VA. J. INT’L L. 563, 564 (1998).
405
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international regulatory techniques, as securitization and
globalization carry business activities farther across national
frontiers.407 Mechanisms inspired by the pragmatic, learning-bydoing approach in Europe would facilitate compromise in areas
where consensus is difficult and would also constrain the
pendulum-like swings that appear to characterize the current
national character.
Progress in this direction, however, must consider carefully
the consequences of allowing companies to select and deselect the
rules according to which they will operate.
Rather than
triggering countries to compete to offer attractive legal regimes,
companies themselves are actively using the SE to press for more
streamlined regulation and harmonized law. Companies want to
take full advantage of intergrated markets, to improve their
position by reducing costs and gaining regulatory predictability.
The companies are several steps ahead of the Member Sates
themselves, which struggle to cooperate to build cross-border
regulatory systems. The Member States’ desire to foster an
integrated market conflicts with their other prudential concerns,
such as maintaining regulatory control and retaining or avoiding
employee representation on boards. Where they can, companies
are bypassing the Member States’ inability to coordinate crossborder regulation by carrying out their own restructuring and
moving directly to regulation by a single Member State.
The approach has placed tremendous power in the hands of
companies to choose the systems around which company law will
begin to converge in Europe. Facilitating their choices may
conflict with protecting the interests of other stakeholders.
Necessary considerations include whether the ability of workers
to organize is helped or harmed by the transformation of their
companies to the SE, the effect of reorganization on creditors and
on managers, and whether SE companies increase systemic risk
in the markets due to reduced regulation or decrease it by
adopting streamlined structures that are more easily monitored
by company directors.
Companies that convert to the SE will provide measurable
answers to these and other questions, useful for evaluating
Europe’s approach to developing a centralized, transnational

407
See, e.g., Vivien A. Schmidt, Democracy and Discourse in an Integrating
Europe and a Globalising World, 6 EUR. L.J. 277, 277 (2000).
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market, in spite of the caution the legislation reflects. The SE
constitutes a valuable test case for gauging the viability of
unified corporate identities and international regulatory regimes.
It should be of significant relevance to legislators and
policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic.

